On 24 September, 2025, the United Nations (UN) Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights (ASG), presented the annual report of the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) on intimidation and reprisals against those cooperating with the UN. The report highlights allegations of acts of intimidation and reprisals committed from May 2024 to April 2025, as well as updates on cases from previous reports.
Reprisals are acts of intimidation, harassment or retaliation against individuals or groups for cooperating with the UN. The annual report includes both newly documented cases from the reporting period and follow-up information on situations previously highlighted, such as changes in detention conditions, judicial or administrative measures, or recurring patterns of intimidation. see also: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20140603192912-22083774–crime-should-not-pay-in-the-area-of-international-human-rights
The UNSG report warns that “more than half of the States reviewed continue to enforce or adopt laws on civil society, counter-terrorism and national security that have the effect of deterring or obstructing cooperation with the United Nations”. In some cases, new or amended legislation has further tightened restrictions on NGOs, complicating their registration and operations, and creating additional obstacles to meaningful civil society engagement with the UN. This trend is particularly pronounced in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), where more than 6 out of 10 cases of reprisals are linked to counter-terrorism or security measures.
On 30 June 2025, ISHR launched its updated Reprisals Handbook in four languages (English, Simplified Chinese, Uyghur and Tibetan), an essential resource for all stakeholders concerned about intimidation and reprisals against those cooperating with international or regional human rights systems.
The UN as well as regional human rights bodies are often the last space where human rights defenders, rights holders, victims and witnesses can denounce violations and abuses. They must be free and safe to cooperate with and give evidence and testimony to these human rights bodies. They must be protected against any form of intimidation or reprisal in association with this engagement.
This handbook is aimed first and foremost at human rights defenders who engage with regional and international human rights systems. The focus is in particular on the United Nations (UN) human rights system, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR).
The handbook highlights the risks that defenders can face from interacting with those systems, and suggests ways in which defenders can leverage the weight of the UN and regional human rights mechanisms to provide some degree of protection against those risks. In doing so, it does not aim to provide a fully comprehensive protection solution. In all cases, defenders should consider which option might be best, based on the context and particulars of a case.
ISHR also aims at diversifying the formats available for defenders to access relevant content, including by publishing a Reprisals Toolkit and a video in the languages mentioned above.
The International Service for Human Rights (ISHR) seeks to ensure that national, international and regional human rights systems have the policies, mechanisms and protocols in place to prevent reprisals and ensure accountability where they occur. ISHR also brings cases of alleged intimidation and reprisals to the attention of relevant officials to press for effective preventative measures and responses, including through our #EndReprisals campaigns. ISHR also maintains the #EndReprisals database, which documents cases of reprisals reported by the UN Secretary-General.
For more information on how to use the UN bodies and mechanisms referred to throughout this handbook, visit the ISHR Academy, which provides free courses in English, Spanish and French.
The second week of witness testimonies continued with the court hearings with Egbert Wesselink and Petter Bolme, two individuals considered central to the broader context of the trial. .. Wesselink provided background on the report’s origins and its significance in bringing the case to light. He also discussed his extensive knowledge of Sudan at the time and his contact with the pre-trial investigation and Lundin oil over the years.
Hearing with Egbert Wesselink
This is a very long report but as the devil in the details……
The second week of witness hearings began with the testimony of individuals who had worked and lobbied for these allegations to be investigated. Egbert Wesselink is a historian working for PAX, the largest peace organization in the Netherlands and the lead author of the report “Unpaid Debt” and involved in the production of the report “Depopulating Sudan’s Oil Regions.”
The prosecution’s questioning focused on Egbert Wesselink’s knowledge of southern Sudan and Block 5A during 1997–2003, his contacts with the Lundin companies during that period, the preparation of the report Depopulating Sudan’s Oil Regions, and his role within PAX and ECOS. He was also questioned about investigation trips to Block 5A and his communication with individuals connected to the pre-trial investigation. During the hearing, Wesselink described the situation in Block 5A during 1997–2003 as highly violent, with conflict over oil-rich areas and systematic or indiscriminate attacks on civilians by the Sudanese military and allied militias. He stated that representatives of the Lundin companies were made aware of these conditions by him from 2000 onward and clarified that PAX and ECOS did not exert undue influence over any interviewees involved in their investigations. Wesselink’s testimony provided crucial context about the violent circumstances in Block 5A and the awareness of these conditions among various actors at the time. It also offered valuable insight into the efforts to document and report the actions of oil companies to the rest of the world, while also highlighting the ongoing pursuit of justice and reparations for the plaintiffs.
The hearing began with Egbert Wesselink talking about his academic background in history and education, early work in politics as an assistant to a member of the Dutch parliament and teaching geography and French, and then his transition into human rights, first as a volunteer, then as a UN officer in Cambodia in 1993. He later worked as researcher and expert for the UN Office for Migration/UNHCR before joining PAX in 1998, where he focused on corporate responsibility and human rights dialogue with various companies. Wesselink recounted his early corporate engagement with the first oil company he worked with, Shell, where alongside Amnesty International he was involved in a dialogue with the company concerning the company’s human rights policies and actions.
PAX and ECOS
In the early 2000s, PAX began working in Sudan, responding to reports of harm caused by the oil industry. After discovering Shell’s ties to Sudan, PAX intervened and discussed the company’s human rights policies and actions, leading to Shell’s withdrawal from the country and its cessation of fuel supplies to the Sudanese air force. Around the same time, Dutch NGOs recognized the need for European-level measures and formed the European Coalition on Oil in Sudan (ECOS) to address what they saw as the oil industry’s role in fueling conflict and displacement. PAX played a central role in forming and coordinating ECOS, which launched officially in Brussels in 2001. The coalition aimed to stop harmful oil activities and to create a more substantial and effective dialogue between the EU and Sudan. ECOS brought together over 50 European NGOs and produced major advocacy and research efforts. When asked about its contact with Sudanese churches and their influence, Wesselink responded by saying that while not directed by churches, ECOS regularly consulted Sudanese civil society and church groups through forums, but he emphasized that the ECOS acted based on requests from affected communities and their interests and rights, not on top-down instructions.
When asked about how PAX and ECOS formed their understanding of the oil operations and their harmful effects, Wesselink explained how they found important observations by John Harker, who in 1991 conducted a mission for the Canadian government. The conclusions they presented aligned with what PAX and ECOS had heard from local residents, churches, and organizations working in the area. This information was further confirmed by reports from the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Sudan and the findings matched entirely with their prior understanding of how the Sudanese government approached the oil issue. Wesselink also described how he met families from areas north of Lundin’s block, who had been forced to flee to Utrecht. Their testimonies were clear, they had been driven from their homes in one of the country’s central oil regions.
Wesselink described how after the initially unsuccessful “Peace First” campaign, ECOS shifted focus in 2002 to promoting responsible oil business standards. By 2003, it no longer called for companies to leave Sudan but instead advocated for reform within the industry. This aligned with the 2003 peace agreement and Sudan’s transitional constitution, which introduced the possibility of compensation to affected communities and international standards for oil operations. But there was also concern from the church and civil society in Sudan that the government would not be strong enough to push for this against an industry that was uninterested and fear that the government lacked the capacity or will to enforce these standards. To address this, PAX organized a major conference in Juba in late 2006, aiming to create space for dialogue on these governance issues.
When asked about ECOS now, Wesselink explained that ECOS no longer exists, following the separation of Sudan and South Sudan, as focus and momentum declined, and according to Wesselink ECOS “died a slow death.” However, PAX continues working toward justice and compensation for communities affected by oil exploitation.
Wesselink’s engagement and contact with oil companies
Egbert Wesselink described how his understanding of the situation in southern Sudan, particularly Block 5A between 1997 and 2003, developed gradually. He became actively involved around 2000, reading extensively, and his first visit to Sudan was in 2004 for a peace conference in Upper Nile, where he gathered firsthand accounts of problems near major oil fields.
Wesselink explained that contact with oil companies varied. He had early and regular engagement with Shell, including participating in a 2000 conference in Munich, where he also met Lundin and Petronas representatives. He had several conversations with Christine Batruch, the head of Lundin’s corporate social responsibility work, which he described as unproductive, noting her denial of human rights concerns and reliance on Sudanese government narratives. He described how he was used to having discussions with oil companies that were upfront about the facts and willing to discuss dilemmas, as morality is rarely black and white—there were many gray areas in these discussions. However, he said that with Batruch it was impossible to have that kind of conversation as she denied well-established facts and showed very little knowledge about human rights and the responsibilities of companies like Lundin in this regard. He described her as appearing to have a combination of real ignorance and purposeful lack of knowledge. Wesselink explained that it was clear that her knowledge was biased and mainly influenced by northern perspectives, as it was evident that the company was following the Sudanese government’s war propaganda that all conflict stemmed from tribal conflicts. He described it like hearing an echo of what the Sudanese government expressed. While Batruch expressed some openness to hearing from southern Sudanese leaders, Lundin ignored Pax’s invitation to have a dialogue regarding ethical guidelines and the oil industry’s impact on the local population. He also stated that he received no response when he asked Batruch about Lundin’s stance on provisions in the peace agreement, which stated that those affected by oil extraction in southern Sudan had the right to compensation and redress and that those affected by the peace agreement were to be compensated.After that, Wesselink had no further direct contact with Lundin, though he was informed that the Church of Sweden had reached out.
Regarding further contact with Lundin Oil, Wesselink described how in late 2001 he raised concerns about former Swedish prime minister Carl Bildt joining Lundin’s board of directors while also being involved with Amnesty Sweden, calling it a conflict of interest. He viewed this dual role as a serious risk to Amnesty’s credibility and structure. Concerned, he wrote to Amnesty International, questioning their cooperation with Lundin. Wesselink explained that he saw it as a great risk for Amnesty to be linked through Bildt with companies accused of serious crimes and that Amnesty should not cooperate with Lundin. However, when he pointed this out, he received a long reply from Carl Bildt defending his involvement, although Wesselink found the arguments factually incorrect. Bildt claimed that Lundin’s presence contributed positively to human rights and peace in the region, which Wesselink strongly refuted, noting that this contradicted all available evidence at the time. He said, “I found these arguments insincere and baseless; they contradicted everything we knew.”
In terms of contact with other companies, Wesselink also engaged with OMV, which was part of the same oil consortium as Lundin. ECOS contacted OMV in 2001, encouraging them to align with international standards. Upon learning more about the situation, OMV’s leadership grew uneasy, especially after commissioning a risk report from the security firm Control Risk Group whose findings raised internal concerns, although they were not a human rights organization. OMV considered halting road construction to Leer due to violence but ultimately yielded to pressure from the Sudanese government. Wesselink noted that OMV often echoed Lundin’s messaging, suggesting coordinated responses.
Preparation of the report “Depopulating Sudan’s Oil Regions”
Regarding the report Depopulating Sudan’s Oil Regions, Wesselink explained that it was based on a 2002 field mission near Block 5A, organized by ECOS and led by Diane de Guzman, with support from journalist Julie Flint. The team flew into the area from Kenya and documented extensive violence and interviewed traumatized civilians. Julie Flint had a camera with her, and they made a short ten-minute film that can still be seen on YouTube, and which they also distributed via the ECOS network. The trip, financed by ECOS, targeted areas near Block 5A and Nhialdiu, where alarming reports of renewed violence were surfacing. The goal was to document these events, recognizing that without credible information, international concern would be lacking. The field data, interviews, and visual evidence were then compiled into a comprehensive report. De Guzman drafted the original document, which included interviews, high-level analysis, and contextual information, but the report itself was then written by Wesselink. The report included interviews, analysis, background on the conflict, and references to arms use and oil revenue.
Unpaid Debt
After 2004, Wesselink and ECOS continued working to ensure oil companies took responsibility for the harm caused during Sudan’s oil conflict. Wesselink believed that Lundin had no real interest in implementing the 2003 peace agreement’s compensation clauses, while his and the Sudanese church’s goal was to make the agreement a success by pushing for reparations. Wesselink recalls that the Sudanese Minister of Justice at the time said, “If there are affected people, they can take their cases to court,” and that became the starting point for assessing the financial damages incurred over the years, followed by lobbying the oil companies to pay these costs. It also became the start for Unpaid Debt as the objective was not only focused on good business practices, but also on ensuring the “debt” was paid.
The prosecution moved on to inquire about the Unpaid Debt report and the individuals involved in its creation. Wesselink explained that he was the main author of the report but had assistance from numerous assistants and received advice and input from others. They also hired a British defamation lawyer to review the report because when the report was finalized in 2008 and sent to Lundin for comments, Lundin’s response, which came via their lawyers, was to claim that the report contained false information that was damaging to the company. They alleged the intent was to harm the company and reserved the right to claim damages. According to Wesselink, such responses are standard tactics companies use when they are unwilling to resolve issues and prefer confrontation instead. This legal threat caused panic among members of ECOS, with the majority of the core group reluctant to risk being taken to court. A smaller faction of members remained undeterred and wanted to move forward with the publication under the condition that the report would be reviewed by a British lawyer due to the UK’s strict defamation laws. This ensured the report’s legal soundness but also resulted in more legally influenced language, which Wesselink speculated might have contributed to the current situation.
The prosecutor then moved on and asked about the recent claims that the photographs in the report were mislabeled regarding the location of where they were taken — Riel in Thar Jath versus Riel in Mankien. Wesselink acknowledged he wasn’t involved in taking the photos and relied on photographers from DanChurch Aid and others. While he could not verify their accuracy, he expressed trust in their work and admitted to being slightly surprised by any alleged mistakes and stated he would be embarrassed if the defense’s claims were proven correct. Despite this, Wesselink maintained that such potential errors would not diminish the report’s overall reliability.
The organization of investigation trips to and near Block 5A
Wesselink was also asked by the prosecution about the organization of investigation trips to Block 5A. These missions were conducted in cooperation with the Sudan Council of Churches and aimed to assess damage and pressure companies for accountability. If companies didn’t respond, findings were intended for the Evaluation and Assessment Committee, which included representatives from the U.S., U.K., and Norway. As a last resort, civil lawsuits were considered. The trips required extensive preparation due to the political sensitivity surrounding oil-related matters. Wesselink mentioned the need to seek support and endorsements for the research from state authorities, the UN, and local chiefs to facilitate the investigation. He also explained how one couldn’t simply go somewhere and “start asking questions about oil” because it was politically sensitive. His role was therefore to travel down to seek support for this work from the local chiefs.
Contacts with the pre-trial investigation
The prosecutor turned its focus to Wesselink’s personal connections to individuals linked to the pre-trial investigation. Wesselink explained that he had limited direct involvement with the pre-trial investigation, having been interviewed twice by Swedish police and attending two meetings with prosecutors. Most contact was minimal, with only some email correspondence. His own involvement with the trial began after civil war broke out in Juba in 2013, where it became nearly impossible for the Swedish authorities to access witnesses. Wesselink and his colleagues suspected the authorities needed help to find witnesses and offered assistance, but the response from the police was vague and Wesselink described them as “mussels” who did not say anything. Wesselink said that they received similar responses from the prosecutors, stating that he and his colleagues had the right to share information that may be helpful to the investigation with the Prosecutor’s Office. However, they did not receive instructions, although the previous prosecutor Magnus Elving did provide general advice stating that witnesses should only be interviewed by the police and should not be guided or influenced in any way.
Believing that firsthand testimony would be crucial to the case, Wesselink and Petter Bolme hired journalist Moses Urhailot in early 2015 to identify witnesses and possible perpetrators in refugee camps across Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Khartoum. Moses had also contacted people who testified in the earlier Talisman case, as some were willing to engage. Moses was instructed to collect only basic contact info and ensure that witnesses were not influenced. Despite identifying 54 potential witnesses, Wesselink believed that only one was eventually used by prosecutors. According to Wesselink, this stark result underscored the failure of their objective to identify individuals willing to testify.
ECOS’s work in South Sudan and Leech Victim Voices
The final part of the prosecution’s questioning addressed the relationship ECOS had with various groups in South Sudan, focusing on interactions following the publication of the Unpaid Debt report. After the report was published, ECOS began receiving more interest from groups in South Sudan. One such group, Leech Victim Voices, was formed by victims seeking justice after being ignored by both Lundin and the South Sudanese government. Wesselink attended their founding meeting in Juba in 2016. Their demands were later published on PAX’s website, and in 2017, Wesselink presented their claims at Lundin’s shareholders’ meeting. He noted Lundin had already been aware of these claims, having warned him in 2013 against making public accusations.
Wesselink stressed that the claims made by the victims were not driven by a desire for monetary compensation but by the pursuit of justice and truth. He emphasized that remedy and reparation as legal concepts must begin with uncovering the truth. This sentiment was echoed in the efforts of Leech Victim Voices, whose primary goal was to ensure that their experiences and demands were heard. He shared the story of Andrew Jagei Hon Diet, a plaintiff who fled Juba after threats and the murder of his neighbor, believing it was meant as a message for him. PAX helped him escape with Petter Bolme’s assistance. Similar threats were reported by others, including former Lundin employees, who claimed they were pressured to testify in the company’s favor. Wesselink and his team took these reports seriously and, with help from regional human rights organizations, relocated witnesses to safety. The details of these incidents were communicated to Swedish authorities and later shared with the plaintiffs’ counsels.
The plaintiffs’ counsel
After the prosecution’s interrogation, Percy Bratt, one of the plaintiffs’ counsels, had a few questions for Egbert Wesselink. The first topic concerned Wesselink’s efforts to warn plaintiffs to be cautious about discussing potential compensation. Wesselink confirmed that he had done so, elaborating on the cultural distinctions within Nuer legal practices. He explained that while similar to Western legal systems in principle, Nuer culture focuses on reconciliation rather than revenge. For the Nuer, an admission of guilt must be accompanied by a gesture of compensation and amends to the injured party. As a result, it is difficult for someone from the Nuer culture to comprehend a criminal case that excludes reparation or compensation. However, Wesselink emphasized that this cultural expectation does not imply material motivation on the part of the victims, whose ultimate pursuit is justice.
When asked about the driving force behind the victims’ participation, Wesselink clarified that their primary focus is truth and recognition, which are essential prerequisites for reconciliation. This universal principle of law in the Nuer belief system is that those who cause harm must take steps to reconcile it. Wesselink noted that for the Nuer, reconciliation holds more significance than punitive measures, and their efforts to share their experiences often come at great personal expense.
Bratt shifted to the topic of the Unpaid Debt report and inquired whether Wesselink and his team perceived threats of a lawsuit by Lundin Oil. Wesselink affirmed this, talking about the likelihood of a defamation lawsuit arising from the report, which the company argued had caused damage to its reputation. As mentioned in the prosecution’s questioning, PAX hired a British lawyer as the UK defamation law, which places the burden of proof on the defendant to demonstrate that their statements were not defamatory, was the strictest. The lawyer reviewed the report to ensure the accuracy of its claims and their alignment with legal standards.
Wesselink also addressed the defense’s claim that the plaintiffs’ statements amounted to SPLA propaganda. He refuted this notion and cautioned against overestimating the political cohesion of SPLA or SPLM, describing SPLA as a predominantly military operation with no unified political line. He highlighted the absence of a coherent political framework within SPLA or SPLM capable of orchestrating such false testimony.
Andreas Sjögren, the other plaintiffs’ counsel present during this hearing, asked a series of questions about Wesselink’s meeting with Christine Batruch at the Milhauim Conference in late December 2000. Wesselink recalled informing Batruch about the disturbing news of human rights violations linked to oil operations, which was a provocative issue tied to the conference’s theme of Corporate Social Responsibility. While Batruch acknowledged the correlation between oil work and abuses like forced displacement, Wesselink found her understanding of human rights lacking. He explained that Batruch emphasized international law and corporate responsibilities without grasping the fundamental processes that define rights. The conversation was described as awkward, with Wesselink pointing out what he believed should be common knowledge for corporate representatives. He again criticized Batruch for combining ignorance with a willful lack of awareness, further noting that her sources were limited and biased.
Lastly, Sjögren asked whether Lundin had the opportunity to respond to the Unpaid Debt report. Wesselink explained that the report was not intended as a lobbying tool against specific companies but noted that Lundin’s response contained falsehoods and lacked counterarguments. Lundin claimed to have refuted accusations made in the Scorched Earth report by Christian Aid through its own report produced in 2001. However, Wesselink questioned the validity of this defense, as Lundin’s report only covered a brief timeframe and failed to address accusations that spanned years.
Cross-Examination by the defense
The defense started their cross examination by asking Wesselink who actually was behind the police report filed regarding suspected violations of international law linked to Lundin Oil’s operations in Sudan. They asked about the police report dated 17 May 2010. This report, submitted by the plaintiffs’ counsels, Percy Bratt’s law firm, requested an investigation into suspected war crimes. Among the attachments to this report was Wesselink’s Unpaid Debt report, which had been submitted on behalf of ECOS and himself to the International Prosecutor’s Office. Samuelsson pointed out a contradiction in Wesselink’s statement, as Wesselink had previously claimed that Sten De Geer was responsible for submitting the report. Sten De Geer is the person who filed one of the police reports regarding Lundin’s activities in Sudan, based upon the book “Affärer i blod och olja” by Kerstin Lundell. Acknowledging the discrepancy, Wesselink clarified that while others may have been involved in the process, he was ultimately the one who submitted it. Wesselink explained that submitting the report was initially intended as a way to inform prosecutors, not to file a formal police report, as ECOS’s original aim was to achieve justice for victims through political, rather than legal, processes. The publication of the Unpaid Debt report was intended to prompt South Sudanese victims to file criminal complaints independently.
Samuelsson then raised concerns about Percy Bratt’s dual roles, suggesting that Bratt’s prior representation of ECOS and current role as plaintiffs’ counsel might pose ethical issues. Wesselink dismissed these concerns, explaining that Bratt stopped representing ECOS well before taking up the plaintiffs’ case and that there was no conflict of interest.
Shareholder status in Lundin Energy
Turning to Wesselink’s shareholder status in Orrön Energy, Samuelsson highlighted what he perceived as a contradiction between Wesselink’s critique of Lundin and his ownership of shares in the company. Wesselink explained that he purchased five shares in Lundin Energy in 2010 in order to be able to engage directly with the company’s management and shareholders. His objective was to use his status as a shareholder to urge the company to respect international law and ethical business guidelines. He defended this approach as a legitimate and widely practiced method for advocacy, particularly in the United States, Canada, and Europe. At these meetings, Wesselink explained his proposals and urged Lundin to assess the human rights impact of their operations and to take responsibility, including paying reparations if harms were found. While he couldn’t recall exact figures, he confirmed that he proposed allocating funds to demonstrate goodwill toward those affected. He also advocated for the resignation of the company’s management, asserting that it was not in Lundin’s best interest to be led by individuals suspected of war crimes.
Samuelsson questioned whether Wesselink had demanded five million dollars in damages at a shareholder meeting. Wesselink clarified that he had proposed that a sum of money be allocated specifically for compensating those affected. He argued that the company’s approach failed to consider the broader consequences of their legal strategy and urged them to correct their practices to better align with international principles and standards. Wesselink maintained that his actions, whether as a shareholder or through his involvement in advocacy, were aimed at achieving justice and accountability for victims, while upholding ethical guidelines for corporate behavior. He said that had the company’s leadership adopted his proposals, the outcome could have been better both for the company and for those harmed. He also pointed out that Lundin Energy no longer exists, suggesting a different approach might have changed that trajectory. Wesselink also criticized Lundin’s defense lawyers for adopting an overly aggressive legal strategy, arguing that it delayed justice for victims and contradicted the principles of human rights the company had publicly endorsed.
When asked about PAX and their neutrality, Wesselink firmly denied that PAX sided with any party in Sudan’s civil war, calling it a “strange question to ask a peace organization” and explained that supporting peace in a conflict does not entail choosing sides. He acknowledged that neutrality in conflict zones can be difficult, as any action taken by a peace organization may be interpreted as supporting or opposing one side but said that PAX maintained professional impartiality.
The 2019 Svenska Dagbladet article and SPLA Update
Samulsson continued by asking Wesselink about Jan Gruiters, who Wesselink described as the former general director of PAX and a good friend of his. Samuelsson referenced a 2019 opinion piece in the newspaper Svenska Dagbladet calling for reparations from Lundin, which Jan Gruiters co-signed. The defense asked whether Wesselink was familiar with SPLA Update, to which Wesselink answered that he did not read this kind of information from the SPLA. Samuelsson then mentioned that Jan Gruiters wrote articles for SPLA Update and questioned whether PAX and had links to SPLA Update. Wesselink denied any connection and instead discussed how even neutral reporting can be exploited by conflicting parties. Wesselink reiterated that he could not explain why the article appeared in SPLA Update but emphasized that neutrality does not prevent information from being used for one party’s benefit, and that this should not deter individuals from speaking the truth.
Carl Bildt’s email
The defense then presented an email from former Swedish prime minister Carl Bildt, in which he criticized Wesselink for forwarding allegations of systematic human rights violations by Lundin to Amnesty International. Wesselink expressed surprise that Bildt had responded at all and stated that Amnesty shared his position regarding Sudan, making Bildt’s involvement in the organization ironic and noteworthy. He viewed Bildt’s response as an effort to deflect substantive discussions by portraying the conflict as tribal disputes. Samuelsson then asked how Wesselink could dismiss the accounts of Lundin staff who were on-site. Wesselink rebutted this, stating the area was experiencing violent clashes at the time Bildt described it as “calm.” He pointed to Nuer defections that intensified conflict and claimed the region was a “bloodbath.” He also noted that Lundin ceased operations shortly after Bildt’s letter, contradicting Bildt’s portrayal of peace. Wesselink described how the violence at the time was widely anticipated and criticized Bildt for failing to acknowledge the reality of the conflict. Wesselink described Carl Bildt’s interpretation as a reversal of reality, attributing it to state propaganda efforts to justify atrocities.
Criticism of Christine Batruch
The defense then addressed Wesselink’s characterization of Christine Batruch, Lundin’s representative, as a “propagandist” for the Sudanese regime. Samuelsson challenged this label, noting Wesselink had never been in Sudan during the relevant period, to which Wesselink replied, “Do you have to have been to a place to be convinced? I’ve never been to Ukraine, but I know there’s a terrible war happening.” He criticized Batruch for dismissing credible reports and for not answering questions about local conditions. Wesselink explained that he relied on the accounts of knowledgeable individuals and experts, whose information he deemed credible, and had suggested to Batruch that Lundin should collaborate with groups outside the Sudanese government to gain a broader understanding of the situation.
Samuelsson pressed Wesselink on whether his information could be considered objective, given that he had not personally witnessed these events. Wesselink responded again that he relied on a wide range of expert reports, field studies, and testimony from displaced people. He acknowledged the importance of source criticism and said he had engaged critically with the materials he reviewed yet found no reason to doubt the integrity of the core information he used.
Discrepancies between photos in Unpaid Debt Report
Samuelsson then focused on errors in photo captions in the Unpaid Debt report. Wesselink admitted to possible confusion over locations with the same name, specifically “Rier” but emphasized that any mistakes were unintentional. Samuelsson pressed further, noting that the report gave the impression that burned huts photographed in the village of Rier were in areas where Lundin operated. Wesselink acknowledged the misleading impression but reiterated that Lundin did not operate directly in that village. He admitted potential errors and commended the defense for spotting them, saying corrections should be made if verified. When Samuelsson questioned whether Wesselink had known about discrepancies in photograph captions dating back to an email from 2018, Wesselink admitted he had asked the photographer for the locations but did not connect the two photographs to their respective names at the time. Though embarrassed by the issue, he stressed that it did not undermine the overall integrity of the report and firmly stated there was no intent to mislead and apologized if the captions were incorrect.
When shown the version of the report which was sent as a copy in the police report discussed earlier, the photo had another caption, which the defense then questioned, stating that Wesselink must have realized that the caption was wrong and altered it. However, Wesselink denied making any deliberate changes. He explained that the confusion might stem from the commonality of village names and the challenges of recalling specific details from among hundreds of locations.
Identifying witnesses and contact with the investigation
The defense moved on, asking questions about Wesselink’s interactions with Swedish prosecutors and police, including emails referring to their collaboration as a “complete failure.” Samuelsson read aloud emails exchanged between police, prosecutors, and Wesselink, asking whether he had received a formal written request for information. Wesselink could not recall receiving such a request but remembered that police and prosecutors had indicated they welcomed any information that could strengthen their suspicions. He clarified that they worked under general guidance to avoid jeopardizing the investigation. Their role was always to support—not lead—the prosecution.
Samuelsson questioned whether Wesselink considered himself suitable to lead the witness identification process. Wesselink replied that the prosecutor was free to use or reject his findings. Asked about Moses, Wesselink explained he was a journalist known for navigating the sensitive political landscape in South Sudan and was considered neutral. Wesselink believed this neutrality made Moses well-suited for the assignment. When asked about Moses’s attitude toward the Sudanese and Khartoum regimes, Wesselink replied that they had never discussed it.
Regarding whether Moses had used a questionnaire form when approaching potential witnesses, Wesselink replied that they didn’t believe so, describing the process as more of a general approach to providing information. He explained that Moses had been tasked with identifying prospective witnesses, as well visiting various areas to gather support from villages, asking them to sign forms as a show of support, and compiling names. He admitted he had no oversight over Moses’s forms and was not familiar with the specifics of how Moses gathered testimonies. The defense then asked questions regarding the list that Moses’s work resulted in. Wesselink explained that they sent the list of names to the prosecutors but did not know much more about what it resulted in. He explained how their work continued with gathering and recording an incident list of threats and violence reported by some of the witnesses and plaintiffs, which they sent to the authorities. Wesselink clarified that they had been contacted by former Lundin employees who reported being threatened by a former security manager for Lundin. Some of these individuals reached out to Wesselink for guidance, which resulted in a report on the threats and violence, which was subsequently forwarded to authorities. Many of these individuals eventually became plaintiffs. Wesselink stressed that it wasn’t PAX and ECOS who sought them out, but rather Lundin, whose actions led them to approach PAX and ECOS.
Failure of peace campaign and EU ambassadors’ visit to Sudan
Schneiter’s defense team finished their questioning and Ian Lundin’s defense team took over. Their part of the hearing opened with a question about why the 2003 campaign driven by ECOS and Pax to align oil with peace had failed. Wesselink explained that the ECOS strategy included suspending oil operations and advocating for human rights benchmarks in the EU–Sudan dialogue. However, according to Wesselink, the EU–Sudan dialogue was ineffective, often serving as diplomatic cover for improving relations with Sudan while avoiding real human rights scrutiny. When the discussion turned to a visit by EU ambassadors to Sudan in 2001, including Block 5A, and why it didn’t alter the EU’s stance, Wesselink described the mission as superficial, recalling conversations with a Dutch colleague who believed it was designed to avoid meaningful follow-up. Wesselink noted that there was a strong political desire within the EU to continue and strengthen constructive engagement with Sudan, driven by economic opportunities for European countries, particularly in light of the US sanctions on Sudan. Regarding the report generated after the mission, Wesselink explained that it resulted in mixed results and expressed surprise that the report had been used as evidence to suggest everything was fine in the region. While it concluded that the visit did not provide evidence of displacement, the report later acknowledged that there was evidence suggesting the Sudanese government had armed militias and used its own forces to protect the oil fields. Wesselink highlighted that the ambassadors had been given a guided tour by Talisman, during which they were shown only favorable conditions. When asked whether the report accurately reflected the region’s situation, Wesselink said it offered a balanced summary, but the timing of the visit in May 2001 was misleading as it occurred during a brief lull in violence, when the government had temporarily secured control and civilians could move around. Thus, displacement wasn’t visible.
Wesselink acknowledged that some of the report’s findings about militias were accurate but emphasized that the that the report was excessive in its defense of oil activities and failed to connect them directly to human rights abuses, either through oversight or by design. When questioned about whether the EU delegation had done a proper job, Wesselink clarified that the diplomats had framed their actions in a diplomatic manner and were doing their job as they believed was right and emphasized that it was true that the delegation had not seen any evidence of displacement at the time because of the timing. The defense had no further questions, and the cross-examination concluded.
Next week In our next report, we will cover the testimony of Petter Bolme.
On 17 June 2024, Maria Elena Vignoli, Senior Counsel, International Justice Program of HRW, reported on several statements by States to rejects recent intimidation efforts.
Ninety-three member countries of the International Criminal Court (ICC) have declared their “unwavering support” for the court in the face of recent threats. The June 14 statement by an unprecedented number of ICC members across the globe follows a slew of threats, particularly after ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan announced on May 20 that he was seeking arrest warrants against two senior Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, along with three Hamas leaders.
On June 4, after the warrant applications were announced, the US House of Representatives passed a bill aimed at imposing sanctions against the ICC, its officials, and those supporting investigations at the court involving US citizens or allies. The bill is now under consideration in the US Senate. The proposed law is reminiscent of the sanctions imposed by President Donald Trump on the previous ICC prosecutor to intimidate the court from pursuing cases against US and Israeli personnel for crimes committed in Afghanistan and Palestine. President Joe Biden revoked those sanctions in 2021 and has so far opposed the current bill.
The ICC is also in Russia’s crosshairs. In 2023, Russian authorities issued arrest warrants against Khan and six ICC judges after the ICC issued an arrest warrant against Russian President Vladimir Putin and another Russian official for war crimes committed in Ukraine. Russian lawmakers also enacted a law criminalizing cooperation with the ICC.
In both the Palestine and Ukraine investigations, ICC officials are simply doing their job. The joint statement sends a strong message that ICC members have the court’s back and will not bow to efforts to undermine its independence.
Here Haris Azhar shares how and why he believes the law can be used as a powerful tool to deal with repression of democratic voices and their rights. Read more from our In My Own Words series here.
My name is Haris Azhar. I would say I’ve been working, in general terms, on human rights issues for the last 25 years. I work across the country in Indonesia on some human rights, issues or situations, and in some conflict areas such as in Papua.
I have been working for and dealing with some vulnerable groups such as labour groups, as well as the indigenous people and victims from the violence as well. These days I practise as a lawyer, I do pro bono and also professional for-profit work where I use the profits work to subsidise the pro bono and public interest legal work. I have also joined some organisations, and I was director for two human rights organisations. So that’s why I’ve been very human rights focused.
In early 2024 me and my friend Fatia were brought to court. We won, and we got a good decision from the court. But this is not the final one, because the attorney general has appealed to the Supreme Court. I think this whole process was meant to serve as an example.
The whole process, especially last year, was intended to be intimidation. The litigation or the pre-trial process was intended to intimidate me [and] not to not say more about the practice of business oligarchs in this country. But myself, lawyers, and groups here said, we would not say sorry. We would not stop speaking, and that those in power could continue their judicial harassment of us and that we would fight them.
And during the fight, a lot of things happened [such as] intimidations, negative accusations and campaigns. They accused us of hoax stories, but actually they did the hoax stories. They took over and intercepted my mobile phone as well. These are the lengths and practices of intimidation in place.
However, the process of the court for people like us, we pretty much don’t really care about the final decisions. We can see the shadow of the prisons, because what the government thinks is important for them is for us to not have democratic voices. There aremany cases by politicians and by business groups that aim to criminalise decent voices, and it has become a [common] practice. There are even consultants that can help you if you would like to know how to criminalise decent/democratic voices.
It’s become an industry against freedom of expression, to show that, “This is what happens if you are against us.” They wanted to show they could bring me to court so the warning was that anyone who becomes the client of Haris should be aware. It was symbolic, and that’s what I mean it is a message to intimidate and to intimidate vulnerable groups especially.
Widespread engagement on human rights, working through organisations, has developed not only my knowledge, my skill, but also my networks. This has also developed my interest in what some of the ways we (as a nation) would like to put on the table with regards to issues of human rights.
As a practising lawyer, we have always believed here that we can use the law [to achieve justice]. However the movement here is not like in South Africa, as an example, where at one point in South Africa there was no real equality. There was no legal institution that could be used to secure fairness. We don’t have that kind of situation here [in Indonesia], but we are still looking for the formalisation of equality and fairness.
We like to use the legal debate, space, and discourse as a way to combat evil, because the law provides the kind of tools or ammunition to attack evil. Those in power hide behind the law and therefore here in Indonesia, most of the battle and discourse always has an element of legality.
I believe that the law is one of the crucial things that need to be handled, in addition to other advocacy issues. Because we know that the law or legal mechanisms are [also] being used by the bad guys, by the oligarchs to justify and legalise their plans and to do their own business. Those in power always say that they have complied with the law, that they uphold the rule of law, but actually we know that the law they comply with is their own creation. It is their own definition. That’s why we [as legal practitioners] need to step in, even though it’s not the popular action to do so.
If those in, and adjacent to, power cannot be left to create what is good and not good within the framework of law. We need to bring in the voices from the ground. We need to bring the voices from the indigenous people. We need to bring the voices from the labour groups, from the students, from the women’s groups, and many other vulnerable groups who are connected to the issues.
This is instead of the politicians and the business groups alone making their own arguments and developing their own definitions. We cannot let them be, and let them take over in that kind of way. Rule of law and legislation, has to be accompanied and coloured by the vulnerable voices and interests. This is why we insist that a part of the campaign, part of the research, is that we take the legal action as well.
The gap between the haves and the political groups on the ground is huge. This has been happening year on year, and it is getting worse every year. The new regulations and legislations that we have here, which very much comply with the interests of the business groups which belong to some politicians, create more loose protection of rights of workers and women. For the youth and the students, they are getting fewer protections for their education and freedom.
There’s no freedom on campus for students anymore, [because of] intervention from the government and the police on campuses. It’s getting obvious these days. So I think we need at least two things. First, figuring out how to protect vulnerable groups, because why they were attacked or would be attacked is because they found irregularities, and problematic issues behind the policies of the government, or the law.
These issues have led to economic issues, social issues, business issues and so the vulnerable groups make a choice where they complain or protest, but they get attacked by police, government and intelligence. That is why we need more collaborations with vulnerable groups.
We also need more friends — lawyers, international advocates, researchers — coming down into the rural areas, and into the urban areas to capture what is happening and make a noise, to campaign. That’s why we need to have the first group that I mentioned before. We need not to deal with the substance of the problem, but with the second layer of the problem, [which is] the attacks of the participation, the effects to the participation. For this we need to have a lot of groups [working on] how to deal with this kind of shrinking space.
We just had the 2024 elections where we campaigned around the threat to our freedoms of speech and expression. Some of the candidates responded very well, but the one that was supported by the current regime didn’t have a strong resonance with what we are saying. In addition to the campaign, along with my criminalisation, myself, some friends and organisations submitted a complaint to the Constitutional Court.
Our complaint was regarding some legal articles which were being used against me and against some journalists. We won the case in the Constitutional Court earlier this year, and an article which had been used to criminalise a lot of people has now been dropped. But this win is very short [lived] because we have some articles within certain laws which allow the police to criminalise speech.
When I said we won, that’s regarding just one article in our criminal code. But in the next year and a half we will have a new criminal code implemented and new articles to criminalise speeches. We will need to challenge those articles in the next two years. It’s like Tom and Jerry, where we play hide and seek. It seems politicians and business need a shield to protect themselves from the public, hence these situations but we keep fighting them using the same law.
Legal institutions are not our institutions yet. They are still their institutions [meaning the powerful]. However to a certain degree, the legal space is an open stage for you to perform, to have a say. I think if we don’t fill the space, it will be filled by those who are not supportive of freedom of speech or freedom of expression.
These are the reasons why I think we have to join legal action. So as to not give space for evil to come in and occupy. Also, legal action is not the only type of work needed. It has to be one among others. For instance there is advocacy work too. But law cannot be neglected and that’s why this current situation (and the coming situations), require more than just focusing on the legal system. It has to be about a collaborative methodology and approach.
AFP on 25 January, 2024 reported that UN experts urge Bangladesh to carry out major human rights reforms to reverse “repressive trends” following controversial elections that were boycotted by the opposition.
Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was sworn in for a fifth term on January 11. Her ruling Awami League party won nearly three-quarters of elected seats in parliament, with allied parties and friendly independent candidates making up nearly all the remainder.
Hasina has presided over breakneck economic growth in a country once beset by grinding poverty, but her government has been accused of rampant human rights abuses and a ruthless crackdown on dissent.
The UN experts said they were “alarmed” at reports of “widespread attacks, harassment and intimidation of civil society, human rights defenders, journalists and political activists, which marred the recent elections”. See also my earlier posts on Bangladesh: https://humanrightsdefenders.blog/tag/bangladesh/.
The experts called on the Government to:
Immediately and unconditionally release all civil society and political activists detained without charge or on charges inconsistent with international human rights law; and ensure fair public trials in accordance with international human rights standards for those charged with criminal offences.
Institute urgent and substantial reforms to guarantee the integrity and independence of the judicial system.
Guarantee the free and unobstructed exercise of freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, refrain from imposing undue restrictions on protests and political rallies, and ensure effective accountability for serious violations of these fundamental freedoms.
Respect the independence, freedom, diversity, and pluralism of the media, and ensure the safety of journalists from threats, physical and online violence, or judicial harassment and criminal prosecution for investigative and critical reporting.
On 17 April 2023, ISHR sent its annual submission to the report of the UN Secretary-General on reprisals and intimidation against defenders engaging or seeking to engage with the UN and its human rights mechanisms. The submission presents a disturbing pattern of intimidation and reprisals in 23 countries.
ISHR’s annual submission to the report of the UN Secretary-General on reprisals demonstrates the need for the UN and States to do more to prevent and ensure accountability for intimidation and reprisals against human rights defenders and others cooperating or seeking to cooperate with the UN and its human rights mechanisms. ISHR’s submission outlines developments in the international human rights system, and documents a number of new cases, as well as follow-up on previously submitted cases.
“In order for the international human rights system to function to its fullest potential, human rights defenders must be able to share crucial information and perspectives, safely and unhindered. However, many defenders still face unacceptable risks and are unable to cooperate safely with the UN.” Madeleine Sinclair, New York Office Co-Director and Legal Counsel. “The vast majority of cases remain unresolved year after year. More must be done to ensure the efforts to document and address reprisals cases also include sustained and consistent follow up. Otherwise, the cost of carrying out reprisals remains too low, impunity reigns and perpetrators are further emboldened“.
The submission presents a disturbing pattern of intimidation and reprisals in 23 countries, with the addition this year of Algeria and France. Cases of reprisals featured in the submission range from States defaming and stigmatising defenders, to criminalising their work, but also to arbitrarily detaining, arresting and killing them.
In Israel, Palestinian defenders face ongoing intimidation and repression as reprisals for their cooperation with UN human rights mechanisms.
In Bahrain, the situation still shows no signs of improving, with human rights defenders continuing to be arbitrarily detained and denied timely and adequate medical treatment by the government.
In Algeria, Andorra, Cameroon and India defenders continue to be criminalised.
In China defenders are still facing online surveillance, harassment and enforced disappearance.
In Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Venezuela and Yemen many more defenders face arbitrary detention, ill-treatment and criminalisation.
Other cases of reprisals include threats, harassment, hate speech, surveillance, property damage, disbarment, death threats, travel bans, enforced disappearances, unjustified raids, dissolution of associations, judicial harassment, smear campaigns, forced deportations, confiscation of travel documents, red tagging, denial of healthcare and family visits as well as accusations of terrorism, among others. Other countries cited in the report include cases in the Andorra, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Burundi, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, France, The Maldives, Morocco, Nicaragua, The Philippines, Russia, and Thailand.
ISHR also submitted follow-up information on a large number of cases, demonstrating that incidents of reprisals and intimidation are very rarely, if ever, adequately resolved.
This year, ISHR is running again its #EndReprisals campaign. The campaign will raise the profile of 6 cases (all included in the submission) and seek to achieve a more sustained attention on the issue of reprisals and follow-up of the cases throughout the UN system. In particular, we want the UN Secretary General to include all the reprisal and intimidation cases in his upcoming report and UN member States to use the opportunity of the interactive dialogue at the Human Rights Council on the Secretary-General’s report in September, as well as Item 5 debates at all sessions, to raise specific cases and hold their peers accountable.
Janika Spannagel on 29 Apr 2021 announced the publication of this new report of the International Service for Human Rights (ISHR). A virtual event to launch ISHR’s new quantitative analysis of the scope and impact of UN action to combat intimidation and reprisals will take place later today at 16h00 Geneva time
The ability of the UN human rights system to function depends on the testimonies of thousands of human rights defenders and victims from across the world who engage with UN mechanisms every year. However, interactions with the UN often come with risks for activists – many face reprisals from their home countries, ranging from severe, violent retaliation to equally effective administrative hurdles to their work in human rights.
Some of these reprisal cases are raised by UN bodies with the responsible government and reported in annual reports by the UN Secretary-General. However, what becomes of the affected individuals’ cases after the UN’s involvement remains largely unclear.
This study aims to both establish a clear understanding of which reprisal cases are raised by UN communications, and to shed light on the question of their effectiveness in improving individuals’ situations.
The project was funded by the International Service for Human Rights (ISHR) and conducted jointly with their New York office between November 2020 and March 2021.
Century Property Developments and Riversands Developments are suing Kristin Kallesen and her nonprofit, Greater Equestrian Kyalami Conservancy (Gecko), for the income they have allegedly lost because of objections raised by her and Gecko against development approvals in and adjoining the conservancy.
A Johannesburg environmentalist and the conservancy she runs have been slapped with a R197-million lawsuit by two property developers after raising what they allege are “obstructive, delaying and frustrating” objections to their projects in Riversands and Helderfontein.
“This threat against Kirstin and Gekco should be opposed vehemently,” said Duigan. “Gekco has been a bulwark against unremitting pressure from development, pushing the urban boundary further and further into natural areas that include essential wetlands and threatened species such as grass owls.”
Developers too often use, “for their own profit”, ecosystem services that residents have conserved for many years at their own cost, she said. “In their advertising, developers glorify the open space, the lovely views, the fresh air — which the development tends to destroy.”
In legal papers, the developers say that Kallesen and Gekco have “abused” the statutory objection and public participation procedures because “frivolous and baseless” objections were filed against all the township applications by both defendants, none of which were upheld by the City of Johannesburg.
This, the developers allege, was to “procure delays”, prevent the developers from developing the properties and cause financial harm.
“The defendants, similarly, for the same reason, abused the statutory appeal procedures provided for in the prevailing town planning legislation and have lodged several entirely unsubstantiated and mala fide appeals against the decisions of the municipality, by virtue of which such townships have been approved.
“Not a single one of such appeals lodged by or on behalf of the defendants have been upheld by the municipal appeal tribunal.”
The financial harm, the developers allege, includes the extension of the holding cost period in respect of such properties before these could be developed in terms of the approved township applications; the continuous escalation of construction costs to be incurred for the development of such properties; the extended period to which the developers were obliged to pay assessment rates charged by the municipality and interest on such amounts as well as the loss of rental income from the delayed occupation of developed structures.”
For Duigan, the lawsuit is a stark reminder of the Strategic Litigation against Public Participation (SLAPP) suit brought in 2005 against five members of the Rhenosterspruit Conservancy, now proclaimed as the Crocodile River Reserve, by Robbie Wray, the developer of Blair Atholl Estate.
“We were sued for R210-million — my share was R45-million. The case was concluded in December 2010 with the developer given short shrift, with costs at the maximum level against him.”
This was the first major SLAPP suit in South Africa, garnering astounding publicity, particularly after the verdict, she said. “It clearly struck a nerve nationally and we were bombarded by calls and letters from people who had been threatened by developers, warning them that they would be dealt with in the same way as the Rhenosterspruit Five. This made people realise that they could oppose intimidation tactics from developers.”
In early February, the high court in Cape Town held that a series of defamation lawsuits totalling R14.25-million brought by the Australian mining company, Mineral Commodities Ltd, and its local subsidiary, Mineral Sands Resources, against three environmental lawyers, two activists and a social worker who criticised its operations is an abuse of legal process.
Belarusian opposition leader Svyatlana Tsikhanouskaya has condemned ongoing mass searches of homes of journalists and rights defenders across the country. At least 25 homes of journalists, rights activists, and their relatives in Minsk and other towns and cities were searched by police and security service officers on February 16. The offices of the Vyasna (Spring) human rights center in Minsk [see https://www.trueheroesfilms.org/thedigest/laureates/7b5ccf60-bf81-11ea-b6a7-3533a3c74ec1] and the headquarters of the Association of Belarusian Journalists were also searched.
Tsikhanouskaya issued a statement on Telegram, saying that those who are looking for “criminals” among journalists and rights defenders should look for criminals among themselves.
“This is the real crisis. In its attempt to cling to power, the regime is repressing those who are defending human rights. As long as this continues, all Belarusians are in danger,” Tsikhanouskaya’s statement says, adding, “Belarusians know how to solve this crisis.“
“With such measures [Belarusian President Alyaksandr] Lukashenka is gathering material for his own trial in an international court together with his associates. We have already forwarded information to the European Union and the United Nations Human Rights Council, asking them to undertake corresponding measures,” Tsikhanouskaya continued.