Archive for the 'human rights' Category

Finland: pilot programme to support human rights defenders

May 17, 2025

On 12 May 2025, Theodoros Benakis posted about a Finnish pilot programme to support human rights defenders

In 2025, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in partnership with Artists at Risk (AR) and the City of Helsinki, will initiate a pilot programme designed to provide temporary support and protection for human rights defenders in Finland. This programme aims to facilitate a three-month relocation for two selected human rights defenders who often operate under hazardous conditions and face significant challenges, including threats and harassment. In severe instances, their lives may be endangered due to their commitment to advocacy.

During their 90-day stay, these individuals can continue their essential work in a safe and stable environment while also fostering connections within local and international networks. The coordination of this programme will be led by Artists at Risk, a Finnish organisation with over a decade of experience developing protection initiatives for vulnerable and persecuted professionals in the arts, including those fleeing conflict situations such as the war in Ukraine.

The City of Helsinki will host this initiative, funded by the European Union’s ProtectDefenders.eu Human Rights Defenders mechanism, alongside contributions from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the City of Helsinki. The experiences and outcomes derived from this pilot programme will play a critical role in informing potential decisions regarding establishing a national support programme in the future.

Hong Kong: Targeting of Exiled Activists’ Families Escalates

May 16, 2025

Father of Anna Kwok Charged with National Security Crime

The Hong Kong police arrested the father of a prominent US-based activist, Anna Kwok, on April 30, 2025, and charged him with a national security crime, Human Rights Watch said today. The arrest of Kwok Yin-sang was the first such prosecution of a family member of an exiled activist. Hong Kong authorities should immediately drop all charges and release him.

The Hong Kong authorities have recently intensified their harassment of the families of 19 wanted Hong Kong activists living in exile. Punishments and harassment against individuals for the alleged actions of another person is a form of collective punishment, prohibited by international human rights law.

The Chinese government has increased its appalling use of collective punishment against family members of peaceful activists from Hong Kong,” said Yalkun Uluyol, China researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The Hong Kong authorities should immediately and unconditionally release Anna Kwok’s father and cease harassing families of Hong Kong activists.”

On May 2, national security police formally charged Kwok Yin-sang, 68, with “directly or indirectly” dealing with the finances of an “absconder” under section 90 of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance, which carries a punishment of up to seven years in prison. Kwok Yin-sang remains in custody with a bail hearing scheduled for May 8. Anna Kwok’s brother was also arrested on April 30 but has been released on bail pending further investigation.

Anna Kwok, 28, is the executive director of Hong Kong Democracy Council, a nongovernmental organization based in Washington, DC. In July 2023, she was among a first group of eight people against whom the Hong Kong police issued arrests warrants and HK$1 million (US$129,000) bounties for violating Hong Kong’s National Security Law.

Since then, Hong Kong police have issued similar baseless arrest warrants and bounties against 11 other exiled Hong Kong activists.

Hong Kong authorities have sought to intimidate dozens of family members of the 19 “wanted” individuals, primarily by interrogating them. In the case of Ted Hui, a resident of Australia, they also confiscated HK$800,000 (US$103,000) from him and his family for having allegedly violated the National Security Law.

There has been a new wave of harassment against these families in recent months, Human Rights Watch said. After the Hong Kong police issued the third group of arrests and bounties against six exiled activists in December 2024, they began to harass their families. In January, police interrogated eight family members and former colleagues of the UK-based scholar Chung Kim-wah, and raided the office of the Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute, with which Chung was formerly associated.

In February the police questioned the aunts and an uncle of Carmen Lau, a UK-based activist and former district councilor. On March 18, police interrogated the stepfather of the activist Tony Chung, who is in the UK.

On April 10, national security police took the parents of the US-based activist Frances Hui into custody for questioning.

The 19 wanted activists have also faced various other forms of harassment. In June and December 2024, the Hong Kong government cancelled the passports of 13 wanted activists, including Anna Kwok. In March, Lau and Chung reported that anonymous individuals sent letters to residents in various London neighborhoods urging them to hand in the activists to the Chinese Embassy in London, citing the warrants and bounties against them. Similar letters were sent to Melbourne-based Kevin Yam, a democracy activist and an Australian citizen.

Many of the 19 activists, including Kwok and Frances Hui, have reported online harassment campaigns, including rape and death threats, since the government issued the warrants and bounties against them. The media reported that an online campaign, which exhibited signs of a previous Chinese government influence operation, sought to mobilize far-right people in the UK to attack activists on the bounty list.

The 19 wanted activists live in the UK, US, Canada, and Australia. The US government in March sanctioned six officials in Hong Kong for using the National Security Law “extraterritorially to intimidate, silence, and harass” the activists. The other three governments have issued statements condemning the arrest warrants, but have not taken action to hold Hong Kong officials accountable. The US government is also the only one that has arrested someone for allegedly harassing a Hong Kong activist on its soil, though the person was later acquitted.

The Chinese government has used two draconian national security laws, the National Security Law of 2020 and the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance of 2024, to dismantle the city’s pro-democracy movement and take away its fundamental freedoms, which are enshrined in Hong Kong’s de facto constitution, the Basic Law. Over 200,000 Hong Kongers have left Hong Kong, among them protesters and activists who have continued their activism abroad.

The AustralianUK, and US governments, the European Union, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights have all publicly expressed concerns about the two security laws.

“Beijing isn’t likely to stop abuses against the families of exiled activists unless affected governments send a strong message that such repression carries a cost,” Uluyol said. “They should fully investigate and sanction Chinese and Hong Kong officials involved, and pass strong laws to protect their residents and citizens from transnational abuses.”

https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/05/04/hong-kong-targeting-exiled-activists-families-escalates

The testimony of Egbert Wesselink in the Lundin case.

May 15, 2025
Gavel on a dark background

On 13 May 2025 Civil Rights Defenders provided information on the progress in the Lundin case [see: https://humanrightsdefenders.blog/2019/04/11/towards-criminal-liability-of-corporations-for-human-rights-violations-the-lundin-case-in-sweden/]

The second week of witness testimonies continued with the court hearings with Egbert Wesselink and Petter Bolme, two individuals considered central to the broader context of the trial. .. Wesselink provided background on the report’s origins and its significance in bringing the case to light. He also discussed his extensive knowledge of Sudan at the time and his contact with the pre-trial investigation and Lundin oil over the years.  

Hearing with Egbert Wesselink  

This is a very long report but as the devil in the details……

The second week of witness hearings began with the testimony of individuals who had worked and lobbied for these allegations to be investigated. Egbert Wesselink is a historian working for PAX, the largest peace organization in the Netherlands and the lead author of the report “Unpaid Debt” and involved in the production of the report “Depopulating Sudan’s Oil Regions.” 

The prosecution’s questioning focused on Egbert Wesselink’s knowledge of southern Sudan and Block 5A during 1997–2003, his contacts with the Lundin companies during that period, the preparation of the report Depopulating Sudan’s Oil Regions, and his role within PAX and ECOS. He was also questioned about investigation trips to Block 5A and his communication with individuals connected to the pre-trial investigation. During the hearing, Wesselink described the situation in Block 5A during 1997–2003 as highly violent, with conflict over oil-rich areas and systematic or indiscriminate attacks on civilians by the Sudanese military and allied militias. He stated that representatives of the Lundin companies were made aware of these conditions by him from 2000 onward and clarified that PAX and ECOS did not exert undue influence over any interviewees involved in their investigations. Wesselink’s testimony provided crucial context about the violent circumstances in Block 5A and the awareness of these conditions among various actors at the time. It also offered valuable insight into the efforts to document and report the actions of oil companies to the rest of the world, while also highlighting the ongoing pursuit of justice and reparations for the plaintiffs.  

The hearing began with Egbert Wesselink talking about his academic background in history and education, early work in politics as an assistant to a member of the Dutch parliament and teaching geography and French, and then his transition into human rights, first as a volunteer, then as a UN officer in Cambodia in 1993. He later worked as researcher and expert for the UN Office for Migration/UNHCR before joining PAX in 1998, where he focused on corporate responsibility and human rights dialogue with various companies. Wesselink recounted his early corporate engagement with the first oil company he worked with, Shell, where alongside Amnesty International he was involved in a dialogue with the company concerning the company’s human rights policies and actions.  

PAX and ECOS 

In the early 2000s, PAX began working in Sudan, responding to reports of harm caused by the oil industry. After discovering Shell’s ties to Sudan, PAX intervened and discussed the company’s human rights policies and actions, leading to Shell’s withdrawal from the country and its cessation of fuel supplies to the Sudanese air force. Around the same time, Dutch NGOs recognized the need for European-level measures and formed the European Coalition on Oil in Sudan (ECOS) to address what they saw as the oil industry’s role in fueling conflict and displacement. PAX played a central role in forming and coordinating ECOS, which launched officially in Brussels in 2001. The coalition aimed to stop harmful oil activities and to create a more substantial and effective dialogue between the EU and Sudan. ECOS brought together over 50 European NGOs and produced major advocacy and research efforts. When asked about its contact with Sudanese churches and their influence, Wesselink responded by saying that while not directed by churches, ECOS regularly consulted Sudanese civil society and church groups through forums, but he emphasized that the ECOS acted based on requests from affected communities and their interests and rights, not on top-down instructions. 

When asked about how PAX and ECOS formed their understanding of the oil operations and their harmful effects, Wesselink explained how they found important observations by John Harker, who in 1991 conducted a mission for the Canadian government. The conclusions they presented aligned with what PAX and ECOS had heard from local residents, churches, and organizations working in the area. This information was further confirmed by reports from the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Sudan and the findings matched entirely with their prior understanding of how the Sudanese government approached the oil issue. Wesselink also described how he met families from areas north of Lundin’s block, who had been forced to flee to Utrecht. Their testimonies were clear, they had been driven from their homes in one of the country’s central oil regions.  

Wesselink described how after the initially unsuccessful “Peace First” campaign, ECOS shifted focus in 2002 to promoting responsible oil business standards. By 2003, it no longer called for companies to leave Sudan but instead advocated for reform within the industry. This aligned with the 2003 peace agreement and Sudan’s transitional constitution, which introduced the possibility of compensation to affected communities and international standards for oil operations. But there was also concern from the church and civil society in Sudan that the government would not be strong enough to push for this against an industry that was uninterested and fear that the government lacked the capacity or will to enforce these standards. To address this, PAX organized a major conference in Juba in late 2006, aiming to create space for dialogue on these governance issues. 

When asked about ECOS now, Wesselink explained that ECOS no longer exists, following the separation of Sudan and South Sudan, as focus and momentum declined, and according to Wesselink ECOS “died a slow death.” However, PAX continues working toward justice and compensation for communities affected by oil exploitation. 

Wesselink’s engagement and contact with oil companies  

Egbert Wesselink described how his understanding of the situation in southern Sudan, particularly Block 5A between 1997 and 2003, developed gradually. He became actively involved around 2000, reading extensively, and his first visit to Sudan was in 2004 for a peace conference in Upper Nile, where he gathered firsthand accounts of problems near major oil fields. 

Wesselink explained that contact with oil companies varied. He had early and regular engagement with Shell, including participating in a 2000 conference in Munich, where he also met Lundin and Petronas representatives. He had several conversations with Christine Batruch, the head of Lundin’s corporate social responsibility work, which he described as unproductive, noting her denial of human rights concerns and reliance on Sudanese government narratives. He described how he was used to having discussions with oil companies that were upfront about the facts and willing to discuss dilemmas, as morality is rarely black and white—there were many gray areas in these discussions. However, he said that with Batruch it was impossible to have that kind of conversation as she denied well-established facts and showed very little knowledge about human rights and the responsibilities of companies like Lundin in this regard. He described her as appearing to have a combination of real ignorance and purposeful lack of knowledge.  Wesselink explained that it was clear that her knowledge was biased and mainly influenced by northern perspectives, as it was evident that the company was following the Sudanese government’s war propaganda that all conflict stemmed from tribal conflicts. He described it like hearing an echo of what the Sudanese government expressed. While Batruch expressed some openness to hearing from southern Sudanese leaders, Lundin ignored Pax’s invitation to have a dialogue regarding ethical guidelines and the oil industry’s impact on the local population. He also stated that he received no response when he asked Batruch about Lundin’s stance on provisions in the peace agreement, which stated that those affected by oil extraction in southern Sudan had the right to compensation and redress and that those affected by the peace agreement were to be compensated.After that, Wesselink had no further direct contact with Lundin, though he was informed that the Church of Sweden had reached out. 

Regarding further contact with Lundin Oil, Wesselink described how in late 2001 he raised concerns about former Swedish prime minister Carl Bildt joining Lundin’s board of directors while also being involved with Amnesty Sweden, calling it a conflict of interest. He viewed this dual role as a serious risk to Amnesty’s credibility and structure. Concerned, he wrote to Amnesty International, questioning their cooperation with Lundin. Wesselink explained that he saw it as a great risk for Amnesty to be linked through Bildt with companies accused of serious crimes and that Amnesty should not cooperate with Lundin. However, when he pointed this out, he received a long reply from Carl Bildt defending his involvement, although Wesselink found the arguments factually incorrect. Bildt claimed that Lundin’s presence contributed positively to human rights and peace in the region, which Wesselink strongly refuted, noting that this contradicted all available evidence at the time. He said, “I found these arguments insincere and baseless; they contradicted everything we knew.”  

In terms of contact with other companies, Wesselink also engaged with OMV, which was part of the same oil consortium as Lundin. ECOS contacted OMV in 2001, encouraging them to align with international standards. Upon learning more about the situation, OMV’s leadership grew uneasy, especially after commissioning a risk report from the security firm Control Risk Group whose findings raised internal concerns, although they were not a human rights organization. OMV considered halting road construction to Leer due to violence but ultimately yielded to pressure from the Sudanese government. Wesselink noted that OMV often echoed Lundin’s messaging, suggesting coordinated responses. 

Preparation of the report “Depopulating Sudan’s Oil Regions” 

Regarding the report Depopulating Sudan’s Oil Regions, Wesselink explained that it was based on a 2002 field mission near Block 5A, organized by ECOS and led by Diane de Guzman, with support from journalist Julie Flint.  The team flew into the area from Kenya and documented extensive violence and interviewed traumatized civilians. Julie Flint had a camera with her, and they made a short ten-minute film that can still be seen on YouTube, and which they also distributed via the ECOS network. The trip, financed by ECOS, targeted areas near Block 5A and Nhialdiu, where alarming reports of renewed violence were surfacing. The goal was to document these events, recognizing that without credible information, international concern would be lacking.  The field data, interviews, and visual evidence were then compiled into a comprehensive report. De Guzman drafted the original document, which included interviews, high-level analysis, and contextual information, but the report itself was then written by Wesselink. The report included interviews, analysis, background on the conflict, and references to arms use and oil revenue.  

Unpaid Debt  

After 2004, Wesselink and ECOS continued working to ensure oil companies took responsibility for the harm caused during Sudan’s oil conflict. Wesselink believed that Lundin had no real interest in implementing the 2003 peace agreement’s compensation clauses, while his and the Sudanese church’s goal was to make the agreement a success by pushing for reparations. Wesselink recalls that the Sudanese Minister of Justice at the time said, “If there are affected people, they can take their cases to court,” and that became the starting point for assessing the financial damages incurred over the years, followed by lobbying the oil companies to pay these costs. It also became the start for Unpaid Debt as the objective was not only focused on good business practices, but also on ensuring the “debt” was paid.  

The prosecution moved on to inquire about the Unpaid Debt report and the individuals involved in its creation. Wesselink explained that he was the main author of the report but had assistance from numerous assistants and received advice and input from others. They also hired a British defamation lawyer to review the report because when the report was finalized in 2008 and sent to Lundin for comments, Lundin’s response, which came via their lawyers, was to claim that the report contained false information that was damaging to the company. They alleged the intent was to harm the company and reserved the right to claim damages. According to Wesselink, such responses are standard tactics companies use when they are unwilling to resolve issues and prefer confrontation instead. This legal threat caused panic among members of ECOS, with the majority of the core group reluctant to risk being taken to court. A smaller faction of members remained undeterred and wanted to move forward with the publication under the condition that the report would be reviewed by a British lawyer due to the UK’s strict defamation laws. This ensured the report’s legal soundness but also resulted in more legally influenced language, which Wesselink speculated might have contributed to the current situation. 

The prosecutor then moved on and asked about the recent claims that the photographs in the report were mislabeled regarding the location of where they were taken — Riel in Thar Jath versus Riel in Mankien. Wesselink acknowledged he wasn’t involved in taking the photos and relied on photographers from DanChurch Aid and others. While he could not verify their accuracy, he expressed trust in their work and admitted to being slightly surprised by any alleged mistakes and stated he would be embarrassed if the defense’s claims were proven correct. Despite this, Wesselink maintained that such potential errors would not diminish the report’s overall reliability.  

The organization of investigation trips to and near Block 5A  

Wesselink was also asked by the prosecution about the organization of investigation trips to Block 5A. These missions were conducted in cooperation with the Sudan Council of Churches and aimed to assess damage and pressure companies for accountability. If companies didn’t respond, findings were intended for the Evaluation and Assessment Committee, which included representatives from the U.S., U.K., and Norway. As a last resort, civil lawsuits were considered. The trips required extensive preparation due to the political sensitivity surrounding oil-related matters. Wesselink mentioned the need to seek support and endorsements for the research from state authorities, the UN, and local chiefs to facilitate the investigation. He also explained how one couldn’t simply go somewhere and “start asking questions about oil” because it was politically sensitive. His role was therefore to travel down to seek support for this work from the local chiefs. 

Contacts with the pre-trial investigation 

The prosecutor turned its focus to Wesselink’s personal connections to individuals linked to the pre-trial investigation. Wesselink explained that he had limited direct involvement with the pre-trial investigation, having been interviewed twice by Swedish police and attending two meetings with prosecutors. Most contact was minimal, with only some email correspondence. His own involvement with the trial began after civil war broke out in Juba in 2013, where it became nearly impossible for the Swedish authorities to access witnesses. Wesselink and his colleagues suspected the authorities needed help to find witnesses and offered assistance, but the response from the police was vague and Wesselink described them as “mussels” who did not say anything. Wesselink said that they received similar responses from the prosecutors, stating that he and his colleagues had the right to share information that may be helpful to the investigation with the Prosecutor’s Office. However, they did not receive instructions, although the previous prosecutor Magnus Elving did provide general advice stating that witnesses should only be interviewed by the police and should not be guided or influenced in any way. 

Believing that firsthand testimony would be crucial to the case, Wesselink and Petter Bolme hired journalist Moses Urhailot in early 2015 to identify witnesses and possible perpetrators in refugee camps across Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Khartoum. Moses had also contacted people who testified in the earlier Talisman case, as some were willing to engage. Moses was instructed to collect only basic contact info and ensure that witnesses were not influenced. Despite identifying 54 potential witnesses, Wesselink believed that only one was eventually used by prosecutors. According to Wesselink, this stark result underscored the failure of their objective to identify individuals willing to testify.  

ECOS’s work in South Sudan and Leech Victim Voices 

The final part of the prosecution’s questioning addressed the relationship ECOS had with various groups in South Sudan, focusing on interactions following the publication of the Unpaid Debt report. After the report was published, ECOS began receiving more interest from groups in South Sudan. One such group, Leech Victim Voices, was formed by victims seeking justice after being ignored by both Lundin and the South Sudanese government. Wesselink attended their founding meeting in Juba in 2016. Their demands were later published on PAX’s website, and in 2017, Wesselink presented their claims at Lundin’s shareholders’ meeting. He noted Lundin had already been aware of these claims, having warned him in 2013 against making public accusations. 

Wesselink stressed that the claims made by the victims were not driven by a desire for monetary compensation but by the pursuit of justice and truth. He emphasized that remedy and reparation as legal concepts must begin with uncovering the truth. This sentiment was echoed in the efforts of Leech Victim Voices, whose primary goal was to ensure that their experiences and demands were heard. He shared the story of Andrew Jagei Hon Diet, a plaintiff who fled Juba after threats and the murder of his neighbor, believing it was meant as a message for him.  PAX helped him escape with Petter Bolme’s assistance. Similar threats were reported by others, including former Lundin employees, who claimed they were pressured to testify in the company’s favor. Wesselink and his team took these reports seriously and, with help from regional human rights organizations, relocated witnesses to safety. The details of these incidents were communicated to Swedish authorities and later shared with the plaintiffs’ counsels.  

The plaintiffs’ counsel  

After the prosecution’s interrogation, Percy Bratt, one of the plaintiffs’ counsels, had a few questions for Egbert Wesselink. The first topic concerned Wesselink’s efforts to warn plaintiffs to be cautious about discussing potential compensation. Wesselink confirmed that he had done so, elaborating on the cultural distinctions within Nuer legal practices. He explained that while similar to Western legal systems in principle, Nuer culture focuses on reconciliation rather than revenge. For the Nuer, an admission of guilt must be accompanied by a gesture of compensation and amends to the injured party. As a result, it is difficult for someone from the Nuer culture to comprehend a criminal case that excludes reparation or compensation. However, Wesselink emphasized that this cultural expectation does not imply material motivation on the part of the victims, whose ultimate pursuit is justice. 

When asked about the driving force behind the victims’ participation, Wesselink clarified that their primary focus is truth and recognition, which are essential prerequisites for reconciliation. This universal principle of law in the Nuer belief system is that those who cause harm must take steps to reconcile it. Wesselink noted that for the Nuer, reconciliation holds more significance than punitive measures, and their efforts to share their experiences often come at great personal expense. 

Bratt shifted to the topic of the Unpaid Debt report and inquired whether Wesselink and his team perceived threats of a lawsuit by Lundin Oil. Wesselink affirmed this, talking about the likelihood of a defamation lawsuit arising from the report, which the company argued had caused damage to its reputation. As mentioned in the prosecution’s questioning, PAX hired a British lawyer as the UK defamation law, which places the burden of proof on the defendant to demonstrate that their statements were not defamatory, was the strictest. The lawyer reviewed the report to ensure the accuracy of its claims and their alignment with legal standards.  

Wesselink also addressed the defense’s claim that the plaintiffs’ statements amounted to SPLA propaganda. He refuted this notion and cautioned against overestimating the political cohesion of SPLA or SPLM, describing SPLA as a predominantly military operation with no unified political line. He highlighted the absence of a coherent political framework within SPLA or SPLM capable of orchestrating such false testimony.  

Andreas Sjögren, the other plaintiffs’ counsel present during this hearing, asked a series of questions about Wesselink’s meeting with Christine Batruch at the Milhauim Conference in late December 2000. Wesselink recalled informing Batruch about the disturbing news of human rights violations linked to oil operations, which was a provocative issue tied to the conference’s theme of Corporate Social Responsibility. While Batruch acknowledged the correlation between oil work and abuses like forced displacement, Wesselink found her understanding of human rights lacking. He explained that Batruch emphasized international law and corporate responsibilities without grasping the fundamental processes that define rights. The conversation was described as awkward, with Wesselink pointing out what he believed should be common knowledge for corporate representatives. He again criticized Batruch for combining ignorance with a willful lack of awareness, further noting that her sources were limited and biased.  

Lastly, Sjögren asked whether Lundin had the opportunity to respond to the Unpaid Debt report. Wesselink explained that the report was not intended as a lobbying tool against specific companies but noted that Lundin’s response contained falsehoods and lacked counterarguments. Lundin claimed to have refuted accusations made in the Scorched Earth report by Christian Aid through its own report produced in 2001. However, Wesselink questioned the validity of this defense, as Lundin’s report only covered a brief timeframe and failed to address accusations that spanned years.  

Cross-Examination by the defense 

The defense started their cross examination by asking Wesselink who actually was behind the police report filed regarding suspected violations of international law linked to Lundin Oil’s operations in Sudan. They asked about the police report dated 17 May 2010. This report, submitted by the plaintiffs’ counsels, Percy Bratt’s law firm, requested an investigation into suspected war crimes. Among the attachments to this report was Wesselink’s Unpaid Debt report, which had been submitted on behalf of ECOS and himself to the International Prosecutor’s Office. Samuelsson pointed out a contradiction in Wesselink’s statement, as Wesselink had previously claimed that Sten De Geer was responsible for submitting the report. Sten De Geer is the person who filed one of the police reports regarding Lundin’s activities in Sudan, based upon the book “Affärer i blod och olja” by Kerstin Lundell. Acknowledging the discrepancy, Wesselink clarified that while others may have been involved in the process, he was ultimately the one who submitted it. Wesselink explained that submitting the report was initially intended as a way to inform prosecutors, not to file a formal police report, as ECOS’s original aim was to achieve justice for victims through political, rather than legal, processes. The publication of the Unpaid Debt report was intended to prompt South Sudanese victims to file criminal complaints independently.  

Samuelsson then raised concerns about Percy Bratt’s dual roles, suggesting that Bratt’s prior representation of ECOS and current role as plaintiffs’ counsel might pose ethical issues. Wesselink dismissed these concerns, explaining that Bratt stopped representing ECOS well before taking up the plaintiffs’ case and that there was no conflict of interest. 

Shareholder status in Lundin Energy 

Turning to Wesselink’s shareholder status in Orrön Energy, Samuelsson highlighted what he perceived as a contradiction between Wesselink’s critique of Lundin and his ownership of shares in the company. Wesselink explained that he purchased five shares in Lundin Energy in 2010 in order to be able to engage directly with the company’s management and shareholders. His objective was to use his status as a shareholder to urge the company to respect international law and ethical business guidelines. He defended this approach as a legitimate and widely practiced method for advocacy, particularly in the United States, Canada, and Europe. At these meetings, Wesselink explained his proposals and urged Lundin to assess the human rights impact of their operations and to take responsibility, including paying reparations if harms were found. While he couldn’t recall exact figures, he confirmed that he proposed allocating funds to demonstrate goodwill toward those affected. He also advocated for the resignation of the company’s management, asserting that it was not in Lundin’s best interest to be led by individuals suspected of war crimes. 

Samuelsson questioned whether Wesselink had demanded five million dollars in damages at a shareholder meeting. Wesselink clarified that he had proposed that a sum of money be allocated specifically for compensating those affected. He argued that the company’s approach failed to consider the broader consequences of their legal strategy and urged them to correct their practices to better align with international principles and standards. Wesselink maintained that his actions, whether as a shareholder or through his involvement in advocacy, were aimed at achieving justice and accountability for victims, while upholding ethical guidelines for corporate behavior. He said that had the company’s leadership adopted his proposals, the outcome could have been better both for the company and for those harmed. He also pointed out that Lundin Energy no longer exists, suggesting a different approach might have changed that trajectory. Wesselink also criticized Lundin’s defense lawyers for adopting an overly aggressive legal strategy, arguing that it delayed justice for victims and contradicted the principles of human rights the company had publicly endorsed.  

When asked about PAX and their neutrality, Wesselink firmly denied that PAX sided with any party in Sudan’s civil war, calling it a “strange question to ask a peace organization” and explained that supporting peace in a conflict does not entail choosing sides. He acknowledged that neutrality in conflict zones can be difficult, as any action taken by a peace organization may be interpreted as supporting or opposing one side but said that PAX maintained professional impartiality. 

The 2019 Svenska Dagbladet article and SPLA Update 

Samulsson continued by asking Wesselink about Jan Gruiters, who Wesselink described as the former general director of PAX and a good friend of his. Samuelsson referenced a 2019 opinion piece in the newspaper Svenska Dagbladet calling for reparations from Lundin, which Jan Gruiters co-signed.  The defense asked whether Wesselink was familiar with SPLA Update, to which Wesselink answered that he did not read this kind of information from the SPLA. Samuelsson then mentioned that Jan Gruiters wrote articles for SPLA Update and questioned whether PAX and had links to SPLA Update. Wesselink denied any connection and instead discussed how even neutral reporting can be exploited by conflicting parties. Wesselink reiterated that he could not explain why the article appeared in SPLA Update but emphasized that neutrality does not prevent information from being used for one party’s benefit, and that this should not deter individuals from speaking the truth. 

Carl Bildt’s email  

The defense then presented an email from former Swedish prime minister Carl Bildt, in which he criticized Wesselink for forwarding allegations of systematic human rights violations by Lundin to Amnesty International. Wesselink expressed surprise that Bildt had responded at all and stated that Amnesty shared his position regarding Sudan, making Bildt’s involvement in the organization ironic and noteworthy. He viewed Bildt’s response as an effort to deflect substantive discussions by portraying the conflict as tribal disputes. Samuelsson then asked how Wesselink could dismiss the accounts of Lundin staff who were on-site. Wesselink rebutted this, stating the area was experiencing violent clashes at the time Bildt described it as “calm.” He pointed to Nuer defections that intensified conflict and claimed the region was a “bloodbath.” He also noted that Lundin ceased operations shortly after Bildt’s letter, contradicting Bildt’s portrayal of peace. Wesselink described how the violence at the time was widely anticipated and criticized Bildt for failing to acknowledge the reality of the conflict. Wesselink described Carl Bildt’s interpretation as a reversal of reality, attributing it to state propaganda efforts to justify atrocities. 

Criticism of Christine Batruch 

The defense then addressed Wesselink’s characterization of Christine Batruch, Lundin’s representative, as a “propagandist” for the Sudanese regime. Samuelsson challenged this label, noting Wesselink had never been in Sudan during the relevant period, to which Wesselink replied, “Do you have to have been to a place to be convinced? I’ve never been to Ukraine, but I know there’s a terrible war happening.” He criticized Batruch for dismissing credible reports and for not answering questions about local conditions. Wesselink explained that he relied on the accounts of knowledgeable individuals and experts, whose information he deemed credible, and had suggested to Batruch that Lundin should collaborate with groups outside the Sudanese government to gain a broader understanding of the situation.  

Samuelsson pressed Wesselink on whether his information could be considered objective, given that he had not personally witnessed these events. Wesselink responded again that he relied on a wide range of expert reports, field studies, and testimony from displaced people. He acknowledged the importance of source criticism and said he had engaged critically with the materials he reviewed yet found no reason to doubt the integrity of the core information he used. 

Discrepancies between photos in Unpaid Debt Report 

Samuelsson then focused on errors in photo captions in the Unpaid Debt report. Wesselink admitted to possible confusion over locations with the same name, specifically “Rier” but emphasized that any mistakes were unintentional. Samuelsson pressed further, noting that the report gave the impression that burned huts photographed in the village of Rier were in areas where Lundin operated. Wesselink acknowledged the misleading impression but reiterated that Lundin did not operate directly in that village. He admitted potential errors and commended the defense for spotting them, saying corrections should be made if verified. When Samuelsson questioned whether Wesselink had known about discrepancies in photograph captions dating back to an email from 2018, Wesselink admitted he had asked the photographer for the locations but did not connect the two photographs to their respective names at the time. Though embarrassed by the issue, he stressed that it did not undermine the overall integrity of the report and firmly stated there was no intent to mislead and apologized if the captions were incorrect. 

When shown the version of the report which was sent as a copy in the police report discussed earlier, the photo had another caption, which the defense then questioned, stating that Wesselink must have realized that the caption was wrong and altered it. However, Wesselink denied making any deliberate changes. He explained that the confusion might stem from the commonality of village names and the challenges of recalling specific details from among hundreds of locations.  

Identifying witnesses and contact with the investigation   

The defense moved on, asking questions about Wesselink’s interactions with Swedish prosecutors and police, including emails referring to their collaboration as a “complete failure.” Samuelsson read aloud emails exchanged between police, prosecutors, and Wesselink, asking whether he had received a formal written request for information. Wesselink could not recall receiving such a request but remembered that police and prosecutors had indicated they welcomed any information that could strengthen their suspicions. He clarified that they worked under general guidance to avoid jeopardizing the investigation. Their role was always to support—not lead—the prosecution. 

Samuelsson questioned whether Wesselink considered himself suitable to lead the witness identification process. Wesselink replied that the prosecutor was free to use or reject his findings. Asked about Moses, Wesselink explained he was a journalist known for navigating the sensitive political landscape in South Sudan and was considered neutral. Wesselink believed this neutrality made Moses well-suited for the assignment. When asked about Moses’s attitude toward the Sudanese and Khartoum regimes, Wesselink replied that they had never discussed it.  

Regarding whether Moses had used a questionnaire form when approaching potential witnesses, Wesselink replied that they didn’t believe so, describing the process as more of a general approach to providing information. He explained that Moses had been tasked with identifying prospective witnesses, as well visiting various areas to gather support from villages, asking them to sign forms as a show of support, and compiling names. He admitted he had no oversight over Moses’s forms and was not familiar with the specifics of how Moses gathered testimonies. The defense then asked questions regarding the list that Moses’s work resulted in. Wesselink explained that they sent the list of names to the prosecutors but did not know much more about what it resulted in. He explained how their work continued with gathering and recording an incident list of threats and violence reported by some of the witnesses and plaintiffs, which they sent to the authorities. Wesselink clarified that they had been contacted by former Lundin employees who reported being threatened by a former security manager for Lundin. Some of these individuals reached out to Wesselink for guidance, which resulted in a report on the threats and violence, which was subsequently forwarded to authorities. Many of these individuals eventually became plaintiffs. Wesselink stressed that it wasn’t PAX and ECOS who sought them out, but rather Lundin, whose actions led them to approach PAX and ECOS.  

Failure of peace campaign and EU ambassadors’ visit to Sudan 

Schneiter’s defense team finished their questioning and Ian Lundin’s defense team took over. Their part of the hearing opened with a question about why the 2003 campaign driven by ECOS and Pax to align oil with peace had failed. Wesselink explained that the ECOS strategy included suspending oil operations and advocating for human rights benchmarks in the EU–Sudan dialogue. However, according to Wesselink, the EU–Sudan dialogue was ineffective, often serving as diplomatic cover for improving relations with Sudan while avoiding real human rights scrutiny. When the discussion turned to a visit by EU ambassadors to Sudan in 2001, including Block 5A, and why it didn’t alter the EU’s stance, Wesselink described the mission as superficial, recalling conversations with a Dutch colleague who believed it was designed to avoid meaningful follow-up. Wesselink noted that there was a strong political desire within the EU to continue and strengthen constructive engagement with Sudan, driven by economic opportunities for European countries, particularly in light of the US sanctions on Sudan. Regarding the report generated after the mission, Wesselink explained that it resulted in mixed results and expressed surprise that the report had been used as evidence to suggest everything was fine in the region. While it concluded that the visit did not provide evidence of displacement, the report later acknowledged that there was evidence suggesting the Sudanese government had armed militias and used its own forces to protect the oil fields. Wesselink highlighted that the ambassadors had been given a guided tour by Talisman, during which they were shown only favorable conditions. When asked whether the report accurately reflected the region’s situation, Wesselink said it offered a balanced summary, but the timing of the visit in May 2001 was misleading as it occurred during a brief lull in violence, when the government had temporarily secured control and civilians could move around. Thus, displacement wasn’t visible.  

Wesselink acknowledged that some of the report’s findings about militias were accurate but emphasized that the that the report was excessive in its defense of oil activities and failed to connect them directly to human rights abuses, either through oversight or by design. When questioned about whether the EU delegation had done a proper job, Wesselink clarified that the diplomats had framed their actions in a diplomatic manner and were doing their job as they believed was right and emphasized that it was true that the delegation had not seen any evidence of displacement at the time because of the timing. The defense had no further questions, and the cross-examination concluded.  

Next week  In our next report, we will cover the testimony of Petter Bolme.  

Russian and Ukrainian human rights defenders focus on end to the war in Ukraine.

May 14, 2025

In the past weeks and months, Russian and Ukrainian human rights activists have been focusing on negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Back in January, human rights activists and the People First campaign raised several issues to parties involved in ongoing negotiations in the hopes that the negotiations would prioritise those affected by the conflict, particularly prisoners of war, detained Ukrainian citizens, Ukrainian children which have been taken to Russia, and Russian political prisoners.

The invasion of Ukraine was only possible thanks to a system of political repression Russia has inflicted on its own people for decades.

In February, on the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a group of UN special rapporteurs and experts called for parties involved in negotiations to put legal and humanitarian issues at the forefront of discussions. They stressed that the Russian government must be held accountable for its aggression and war crimes in Ukraine committed, and its repressive policies towards its own citizens.

The invasion of Ukraine was only possible thanks to a system of political repression Russia has inflicted on its own people for decades. According to experts, over 3,000 individuals have been persecuted by Russian authorities for political reasons. Despite recent efforts by human rights activists to advocate for person-centred negotiations, it seems more and more doubtful that the focus will be on human rights

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has challenged the established system of international relations, which has now proven to be woefully fragile. Most countries see Putin’s decision to unleash outright war on Ukraine as unacceptable. While many democratic countries have continued to provide Ukraine with assistance, this has at times proven insufficient in the face of Russian violence.

Since January, the rejection by the US of legal norms in place since the two world wars has unleashed a new crisis in international politics.

US tactics to repeal basic human rights seem eerily familiar for Russian activists, who have been fighting similar state tactics for the past 25 years.

The new American administration’s policy is increasingly similar to Putin’s own tactics. Both favour the “right of the strong”, whereby great powers can decide the fate of others and dictate conditions. The US has shown itself to be less interested in international law, making it increasingly easy for norms to be overlooked.

US tactics to repeal basic human rights seem eerily familiar for Russian activists, who have been fighting similar state tactics for the past 25 years. Russians knew a world without regard for international human rights or legal norms long before 2025, or the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

For 25 years, Putin’s government has created a country which prioritises the interests of the state and denies basic human rights.

What is happening in the US is recognisable to many Russians.

By wanting to end the war in Ukraine and find a quick solution, the US president is effectively equating the aggressor with the victim of aggression.

Negotiations thus far suggest Trump is more likely to ensure Russian interests that are detrimental both to the safety of the Ukrainian people, who have been subjected to aggression and occupation, and to justice and a sustainable peace.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was the result of years of human rights violations within Russia and the lack of a response from the international community to these violations.

An unfair peace — a “deal” that contradicts the norms of international law — sets a dangerous precedent. It normalises the war against Ukraine, thereby giving Russia the green light to repeat its aggression and to enact even harsher repressive policies inside Russia.

Such a “deal” is a signal to the whole world, a move towards dangerous instability, reminiscent of the brink of the outbreak of the world wars. Departing from the principles of human rights and international law in peacekeeping practices encourages impunity and will inevitably lead to new wars of aggression. Democracy in many countries will also be at risk, as the new rules of the game will open up opportunities for autocrats and dictators to violate human rights in their countries without regard for international institutions and their international obligations.

No peace without rights 

We call on the leaders of all democratic countries, all politicians for whom human rights are not merely empty words, and civil society to take a stand and bring human rights back into international politics.

This is the only way to create reliable conditions for long-term peace in Europe and prevent the emergence of new-large scale military conflicts globally. Otherwise, the world will find itself in a situation where the fate of countries and the people living in them will be decided through wars unleashed by imperialist predators.

We call on all parties taking part in peace negotiations in Ukraine to prioritise the human aspect: the fate of prisoners of war and the protection needed for civilians, including in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.

We insist that negotiations be based on the fundamental norms of international legal agreements, including the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, as they define aggression, protect the principle of territorial integrity and sovereignty, and link military and political security with human rights. Without this, it will be impossible to achieve a just and sustainable peace.

The appeal was drafted and signed by members of the the Council of Russian Human Rights Defenders: Galina Arapova, Sergey Davidis, Yury Dzhibladze, Leonid Drabkin, Sergey Krivenko, Sergey Lukashevsky, Karinna Moskalenko, Oleg Orlov, Lev Ponomarev, Alexander Cherkasov, and Yelena Shakhova.

The names of the other Council members who signed the appeal are not given for security reasons.

https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2025/05/11/no-peace-without-human-rights-en

https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/590898

Venezuela: Where is Eduardo Torres? 

May 13, 2025

ISHR, T

ISHR, the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, a partnership of the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) and the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), request your urgent intervention in the following situation in Venezuela.

The Observatory has been informed of the disappearance of Mr. Eduardo Torres, a labour lawyer who has been a member for over five years of the Venezuelan Education-Action Program on Human Rights (PROVEA), an FIDH member organisation.

According to witnesses, Eduardo Torres was last seen on Friday, 9 May 2025 at 4:00 p.m. in Parque Central in Caracas, after attending a meeting. At that moment, Mr. Torres contacted his family and informed them he was heading home, near Av. Fuerzas Armadas in Caracas, but he never arrived.

Seeking information about Eduardo Torres’ whereabouts, his wife, Ms. Emiselys Nuñez, accompanied by PROVEA members, have visited various detention centres in Caracas, including the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN) at El Helicoide, several National Bolivarian Police (PNB) stations in Maripérez, Boleíta and Petare, as well as the General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM) in Boleíta. As of the publication of this urgent appeal, his whereabouts remain unknown.

On 11 May 2025, Ms. Emiselys Nuñez and PROVEA’s legal team went to the Palace of Justice to submit a “Habeas Corpus” petition before the Judge of First Instance in Control Functions of the Criminal Judicial Circuit of the Metropolitan Area of Caracas, Specialised in protection matters, to request information on whether Eduardo Torres had been detained by the Venezuelan State. However, after more than seven hours of waiting, they were not “authorised” to receive the document, without providing details, and in clear violation of Article 27 of the National Constitution and Articles 2, 3, and 4 of the Organic Law of Personal Liberty and Security.

On 12 May 2025, the PROVEA team, along with Mr. Torres’ wife and mother, went to the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice and handed the “Habeas Corpus” petition at 12:10 pm.

The Observatory highlights that Mr. Torres has been repeatedly been subjected to threats and acts of harassment by Venezuelan police officers. Like the rest of the PROVEA team, he is a beneficiary of precautionary protection measures granted by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) due to repeated threats, criminalisation, and harassment in connection with his human rights work in Venezuela.

The Observatory recalls that on 7 January 2025, Mr. Carlos Correa, former PROVEA coordinator, was intercepted in the centre of the capital Caracas by hooded officials. His whereabouts remained unknown for several days before he was released on 16 January 2025.

The Observatory also recalls that on 15 October 2024, the passport of Mr. Torres, among other human rights defenders and/or persons identified as opponents, was cancelled in a selective and discretionary manner as a mechanism of repression and intimidation to prevent him from leaving the country and/or cooperating with international protection mechanisms, thus violating his rights to identity, free transit and mobility.

The Observatory expresses its deepest concern due to the high probability that Mr. Eduardo Torres is in a condition of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance, due to his work as a human rights defender and given the constant threats against him. If confirmed, these acts would increase the risk of torture and ill-treatment against him.

The Observatory underlines that this disappearance occurs two weeks before the national and regional elections scheduled for 25 May 2025, again highlighting the risks against human rights defenders in Venezuela and exemplifying a systematic attempt to silence all critical voices committed to human rights and democracy in the country.

The Observatory urges the Venezuelan authorities to guarantee the physical and psychological security of Mr. Eduardo Torres, to disclose his whereabouts and to proceed to his immediate and unconditional release, in case he is indeed detained by State actors.

https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/human-rights-defenders/venezuela-disappearance-of-eduardo-torres-member-of-provea

Front Line Defenders’ Global Analysis 2024/25

May 13, 2025

Resilience of Human Rights Defenders a Source of Hope Amid Global Rollback on Rights – At least 324 defenders killed in 32 countries for their peaceful work in 2024

Frontline Defenders

On 6 May 2025 Front Line Defenders Global Analysis 2024/25 was published giving a detailed panorama of the violations against HRDs at risk in 105 countries in all regions. Despite an increasingly hostile world with expanded threats to their work, human rights defenders (HRDs) everywhere demonstrated a remarkable level of resilience and determination as they resisted a global rollback on human rights, Front Line Defenders said as it launched its flagship report.

The report also reveals statistics gathered and verified by the HRD Memorial – which Front Line Defenders coordinates – documenting the killings of at least 324 HRDs in 32 countries in 2024. HRDs working on land rights, citizen’s rights and Indigenous peoples’ rights each made up almost a fifth of the total, and the countries with the highest number of killings documented were Colombia (157), Mexico (32), Guatemala (29), Palestine (22) and Brazil (15). (See pp. 6-13 for complete data.)

Year on year, hundreds of human rights defenders pay the ultimate price when they are killed for their work, having a devastating impact on their families and communities. It is a grim reflection of the immense danger faced by those who work peacefully to defend human rights,” said Alan Glasgow, Executive Director of Front Line Defenders.“Other threats and risks are manifold. Front Line Defenders’ analysis shows that women’s rights defenders globally and HRDs working in situations of conflict were among those most targeted for their work. It is a remarkable sign of these defenders’ courage that they continue their struggle despite such immense danger. They are the best among us, who fervently believe a better world is worth fighting for.”

Arbitrary arrest/detention was the most commonly reported violation against HRDs around the world, followed by threats/other harassment, legal action, death threats and surveillance. Women HRDs reported slightly higher levels of threats/other harassment compared to their male counterparts, while trans and non gender-conforming HRDs reported this as the most common violation they faced overall.

Criminalisation of HRDs remained rife with 107 charges filed in 75 cases. The most commonly cited charges were linked to defamation (23.4%); national security (19.6%); other criminal charges (12.1%); public order offences (11.2%); and terrorism-related charges (11.2%). In every region, governments and non-state actors turned to the judicial system to disrupt, stymie, stigmatise, bankrupt and imprison HRDs, regardless of the human rights they were defending. Counter-terrorism legislation and “Foreign Agent” laws were among those weaponised for use against HRDs.

According to Front Line Defenders data, defenders working on women’s rights were among the most targeted globally in 2024, ranking in the top three for all regions except one. This trend played out in numerous ways, with women human rights defenders (WHRDs) subjected to smear campaigns, criminalisation, arbitrary arrest and detention, as well as targeted with threats – including threats of sexual and gender-based violence.

WHRDs played key roles in protest movements seeking more just societies – for example in Bangladesh – faced stark discrimination in countries like Afghanistan and Iran, and shouldered heavy burdens in conflict and crisis situations, ranging from Gaza to Colombia, DRC, Myanmar, Sudan and Ukraine.

Dr. Mahrang Baloch, an outspoken WHRD from Pakistan’s Balochistan region, faced ongoing risks throughout the year, including travel bans, smear campaigns and arbitrary detention. At the time of publication she remains jailed in Quetta after being arbitrarily arrested for leading a peaceful protest. In a foreword provided to Front Line Defenders, she described why HRDs persist in their struggle:

We must continue to resist. Because human rights defenders are the ones standing on the frontlines, risking everything so that others may find their missing loved ones, so that everyone can go to school, so that the silenced can speak, so that women raped in refugee camps can find justice, so that those fighting alone in their homes, their villages, their cities can know they are not alone. We must stand with them, and we must stand together. Not for a nation. Not for a religion. Not for a race. But for humanity. Because if we do not, who will?

For last year’s, CF: https://humanrightsdefenders.blog/2024/05/22/front-line-defenders-launches-global-analysis-2023-24-on-human-rights-defenders/

For more information or to receive a full copy of the report, please contact:

Conor Fortune
Frontline Defenders
+353 85 802 0895
cfortune@frontlinedefenders.org

https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/resource-publication/global-analysis-202425

https://www.wric.com/business/press-releases/ein-presswire/808917521/remarkable-resilience-of-human-rights-defenders-a-source-of-hope-amid-global-rollback-on-rights/

Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies focuses on human rights defenders

May 1, 2025

A European project of the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, presents a round-up of the latest and most innovative research on the European Union’s role in an evolving global context in a quarterly newsletter, featuring summaries of key findings and access to more in-depth discussions through EU-RENEW webinars, blogs and podcasts.

The eighth issue focuses on human rights defenders.

Human Rights Defenders (HRDs) often stand on the frontlines of global struggles—exposing injustice, seeking accountability, and working to prevent further rights violations. While the European Union has long been committed to the protection of HRDs, shrinking civic space and democratic backsliding within its own borders have exposed troubling gaps: from limited pathways for HRDs to enter or remain in the EU, to the criminalization of HRDs’ work and the rise of strategic lawsuits designed to silence them.

In its latest blog, Anna Puigderrajols Triadó examines the EU’s evolving approach to HRDs and the urgent need for stronger, more consistent protections.

Some recommendations:

Human Rights Violations Committed Against Human Rights Defenders Through the Use of Legal System: A Trend in Europe and Beyond Aikaterini-Christina Koula. Human Rights Review, 25, 2024This article explores the growing weaponization of legal systems to silence human rights defenders, particularly in Europe, developing a taxonomy of legal tactics used against HRDs

Just Pathways to Sustainability: From Environmental Human Rights Defenders to Biosphere Defenders, Claudia Ituarte-Lima et al. Environmental Policy and Law, 53(5-6), 2023

Building on the concept of Environmental Human Rights Defenders, the authors advance a new concept of ‘Biosphere Defenders’ and a ‘Defend-Biosphere Framework’ to analyse the role of these actors as agents of change in pathways towards just sustainability.

The environmental rule of law and the protection of human rights defenders: law, society, technology, and markets Elif OralInternational Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 24, 2024, This article considers the importance of legal regulation and state intervention for creating a safe and just space for the activities of the Environmental Human Rights Defenders.

Gender-Transformative Remedies for Women Human Rights Defenders. Aleydis Nissen Business and Human Rights Journal, 8(3), 2023. This article explores gender-transformative remediation – which should bring change to patriarchal norms and unequal power relations – for women human rights defenders who fight against corporate human rights abuses.

https://mailing.kuleuven.be/r-6064b8a35903338e724c198e434dd5c3cb5e5e10d2d00f5d

UAE: Dissidents, Relatives Designated ‘Terrorists’

April 30, 2025

Emirati authorities have designated as “terrorist” 11 political dissidents and their relatives as well as 8 companies they own, reflecting the country’s indiscriminate use of overbroad counterterrorism laws and contempt for due process, Human Rights Watch said on 22 April 2025.

On January 8, 2025, Emirati authorities announced a cabinet decision unilaterally adding the 11 individuals and 8 companies to its terrorism list for their alleged links to the Muslim Brotherhood, without due process. The authorities did not inform these individuals or entities prior to the designation, nor was there any opportunity to respond to or contest the allegations. The move represents an escalation of the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) transnational repression, targeting not only dissidents but also their family members.

“Throwing nineteen people and companies onto a list of alleged terrorists without any semblance of due process, and with serious ramifications for their livelihoods, makes a mockery of the rule of law,” said Joey Shea, United Arab Emirates researcher at Human Rights Watch…

Human Rights Watch found that all eight companies are solely registered in the United Kingdom and are owned or previously owned by exiled Emirati dissidents or their relatives. At least nine of the eleven designated individuals are political dissidents or their relatives. Only two of the eleven have been convicted or accused of a terrorist offense, though both under questionable circumstances, according to informed sources and the Emirates Detainees Advocacy Center (EDAC), a human rights organization supporting imprisoned human rights defenders in the UAE. One was convicted in absentia as part of the grossly unfair “UAE94” mass trial of political dissidents in 2013. The other was accused in a separate case related to supporting the “UAE94” detainees.

Individuals on the list found out about the designation only after the Emirates News Agency (WAM), the UAE’s official state news agency, published it on its website. It came as “a real shock, it was very difficult,” one of the people named told Human Rights Watch.

Human Rights Watch searched for the individuals and companies on global terror and financial sanctions lists, including the United Nations Global Sanctions list, the European Union Sanctions list, and the Consolidated List of Financial Sanctions Targets in the UK. None of them are included in these internationally recognized lists.

The UAE’s 2014 counterterrorism law uses an overly broad definition of terrorism and allows the executive branch to designate individuals and entities as terrorists without any corresponding legal requirement to demonstrate the objective basis of the claim. It does not set out a clear procedure for how this authority should be exercised, nor does it provide for any oversight.

Designated individuals face immediate asset freezes and property confiscation under the counterterrorism law and Cabinet Decision No. 74/2020. Those in the UAE, including relatives or friends, face a possible sentence of life in prison for communicating with anyone on the list. Human Rights Watch found that the designation has negatively affected individuals’ careers and personal finances, including through lost career opportunities and clients.

Exiled Emirati dissidents said the designations are part of the UAE’s ongoing crackdown on dissent and political opposition. “They want to hurt us as much as possible,” one individual whose name appeared on the list said.

Over the last decade, Emirati authorities have repeatedly targeted the Muslim Brotherhood and its Emirati branch, the Reform and Social Guidance Association (Al-Islah), in a widespread crackdown. Al-Islah is a nonviolent group that engaged in peaceful political debate in the UAE for many years prior to the crackdown and advocated greater adherence to Islamic precepts. Many of the detainees from the grossly unfair “UAE94” mass trial in 2013 are members of Al-Islah. The UAE designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization in 2014.

The 2014 counterterrorism law enables the courts to convict peaceful government critics as terrorists and sentence them to death. The law has been repeatedly used against political dissidents. In July 2024, 53 human rights defenders and political dissidents were sentenced to abusively long terms in the country’s second-largest unfair mass trial.

The UN’s first special rapporteur on counterterrorism and human rights has said that terrorism should be defined as narrowly as possible, warning that “the adoption of overly broad definitions … carries the potential for deliberate misuse of the term … as well as unintended human rights abuses.”

…The UAE appears to be escalating its persecution beyond openly outspoken dissidents to include family members who have not participated in politics nor spoken publicly about the country’s human rights record. “Many people whose names are on the list, they didn’t speak loudly against the government,” one person said.

In 2021, the UAE added 38 individuals and 15 entities to its terrorism list, including 4 prominent exiled Emirati dissidents. Human Rights Watch found that 14 of the 38 individuals and two of the entities are on other international global terror and financial sanctions lists. None of the individuals nor entities added on January 2025 were found on other internationally recognized lists…

https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/04/22/uae-dissidents-relatives-designated-terrorists

Human Rights Defenders Protective Fellowship Programme in South Africa

April 29, 2025

The inaugural Fellowship at the University of the Western Cape is designed as a rest and respite for Human Rights Defenders (HRDs) working in stressful environments.

Our three-month, non-academic Fellowship Program provides Human Rights Defenders (HRDs) working in stressful environments a safe space to rest, recharge, reflect on their work, and take advantage of opportunities to acquire new skills and knowledge at the University of the Western Cape. HRDs often face difficulties, including fatigue, burnout, and persecution in the form of arrests, threats, and other traumatic experiences. This unique initiative is a response to the need to provide support and strengthen the capacity of HRDs to continue their work. 

While at our University, Fellows have opportunities to audit academic courses, present as guest speakers in lectures and other platforms, and attend writing and other workshops. By engaging in these various activities, Fellows share their knowledge, thereby enriching the teaching and learning experiences. The Fellows also have the space and resources to remain involved in activism in their home country or region. The Africa Hub collaborates with various actors within the UWC campus and in civil society to provide psychosocial support to its Fellows. Outside the university, they also tour and engage with South African democratic institutions and places of historical significance that symbolise human rights struggles. Other key aspects of the Fellowship are networking with civil society organisations in Cape Town and community visits for cultural exchange. 

The first cohort in 2024 had three HRDs from Mozambique, Uganda and Kenya. The Fellows’ programme is oriented towards rest and respite. The future Fellowships may have different emphases, depending on the participants’ needs and other factors. 

Selection process: The selection of fellows is based on a closed nominations system. 

Reach out at pugresearch@uwc.ac.za to add your organisation to our list of contacts for the fellowship programme call for nominations. 

https://pugresearch.org.za/africa-hub-fellowship-programme/

Environmental defenders and the Escazú Agreement

April 28, 2025

From 7-10 April, the Latin American and Caribbean Forum on Environmental Human Rights Defenders brought together environmental defenders, Indigenous Peoples, civil society, and government representatives in Basseterre, Saint Kitts and Nevis.

The Escazú Agreement is a landmark regional human rights treaty that guarantees access to environmental information, public participation and justice in Latin America and the Caribbean. Article 9 describes States’ obligation to protect human rights defenders in environmental matters and guarantee their rights, including those related to access to information, participation, and justice, as set forth in the agreement.  

As of today, 17 countries are parties to the agreement, while other key countries in the region still haven’t signed or ratified it. In February 2025, Special Procedures mandate holders sent a communication to these countries urging them to sign and ratify the agreement.  

The 2024 Action Plan adopted by the parties to the Escazú Agreement aims to implement practical protections for human rights defenders in environmental matters. It outlines capacity building and assessment, calling for urgent national action to address immediate threats and ensure the continuity of defenders’ work.

Since April 2024, individuals who believe that a State is not complying with its obligations as a party to the Escazú Agreement can send information (‘communications’) to the treaty’s Implementation and Compliance Support Committee. At a 2024 Conference of the Parties (COP) to the Agreement, States agreed to incorporate a gender perspective within the Escazú Agreement, recognising the unique risks faced by women human rights defenders in environmental matters.

This decision further requires States to consider gender-based violence and ensure women’s participation, enhancing security and effectiveness for all defenders. 

At the Forum on Environmental Human Rights Defenders, the #EscazuEnlaCorteIDH initiative was presented during the Third Forum. This initiative seeks to ensure that Escazú standards are included in the Inter-American Court’s forthcoming advisory opinion on the climate emergency.

A central piece of this effort was the amicus brief co-submitted by ISHR. 

see also: https://humanrightsdefenders.blog/tag/escazu-agreement/

https://ishr.ch/latest-updates/better-protection-and-participation-of-environmental-human-rights-defenders-through-effective-implementation-of-the-escazu-agreement